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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of December 7, 1941, 350 Japanese 
aircraft attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, 
without a declaration of war. On the following day, an 
outraged U.S. government declared war against Japan. 
Hostilities between the two countries lasted for nearly four 
years, until the Japanese government unconditionally 
surrendered on August 14, 1945. 
For the Japanese, the war has held a special meaning 
for the past five decades. The rise of fascism and 
militarism in Japan before and during the war and their 
consequences are still a nightmare or dream-like reality. 
The tremendous human sacrifices to the war are 
unforgettable. Feelings of regret and remorse are reflected 
in the fact that most Japanese people support Article 9 of 
the Japanese Constitution, which eternally prohibits the 
nation from engaging in any military conflict. Moreover, 
the "sneak" attack on Pearl Harbor particularly stands as a 
reminder to the people that Japan initiated the conflict 
and, therefore, must accept full war responsibility. 
For many older Japanese, war guilt has not been easy to 
accept—not because they dispute what happened at Pearl 
Harbor, but because they were the victims of incessant pre¬ 
war propaganda that portrayed government and military policy 
as fully justified in the face of external threats and 
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domestic needs. The Japanese press, under the absolute 
control of the ruling powers, constantly reinforced the 
logic of economic and military expansion. As a result, the 
public, with no other sources to turn to, came generally to 
accept the justice and necessity of the Japanese cause in 
southeast Asia and the Pacific. In this sense, the Japanese 
mass media were also instrumental in transforming this 
acceptance into enthusiastic support for the national 
mobilization and war effort. 
Before and during World War II, the Japanese media were 
rigidly controlled by the government and military leaders. 
All news content in the media was forced to adhere to 
government policy. Access of news reporters to information 
sources was restricted only to government and military 
handouts and official news agency reports. Strict press 
regulations and well-organized pre- and post-publication 
censorship systems were created. These regulations were 
gradually extended to the extra-legal range, and violators 
were seriously punished. As a result, the Japanese media, 
especially the newspapers, became an effective tool of the 
official propaganda machine, calling for "national unity" to 
accomplish the goals inherent in "The Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere." 
For example, Asahi Shinbun. then the largest daily, 
wrote in its evening edition on December 8, 1941: "With 
respect to the Imperial Decree of war declaration [against 
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the United States and Great Britain], the spirit is 
trembling with a great excitement. This is the time when 
all of us devote our lives to the Imperial nation."1 Not 
surprisingly, all other newspapers followed in the same 
manner. Lafe Allen, in 1947, reported that government 
controls over the Japanese press during the war were so 
successful that "A sameness marked the appearance of all 
newspapers and little opportunity for even the simplest 
expression for a free press existed."2 
As Allen observed, the official controls brought about 
the total uniformity of Japanese press coverage. The 
enemies were portrayed as an aggregate of "evil" and 
"inhuman" people, with weak morals, morale, and materials, 
who "ill-treated" the Asian people in their colonies and 
"plundered" abundant natural resources. Therefore, to 
accomplish the "independence and peace" of Asians, these 
enemies had to be removed from the whole of Asia. Only the 
"virtue of the Japanese spirit" could save the "Asian 
fellows" by its "strong" leadership. And, of course, the 
ultimate victory of such "superior spirit" was described as 
"inevitable." 
Overall, it has been accepted by scholars that while 
domestic Japanese war propaganda was effective during World 
War II, it did not achieve the same levels of saturation, 
sophistication or malevolence as did that of the Nazis under 
Joseph Goebbels. The reasons for this have yet to be 
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defined fully, but two factors are doubtless the lack of 
experience in the realm of propaganda and the unique 
traditions and culture of the Japanese people. 
In fact, Japanese war propaganda has been much less 
studied than the efforts of Germany, Great Britain and the 
United States, and rarely has it been empirically tested. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of Japanese propaganda not only would 
contribute to the overall understanding of such wartime 
techniques, but would also help understand some of the 
changes in the mass media in Japan after 1945. 
The main objective of this study is to identify through 
quantitative analysis the content trends of three Japanese 
national newspapers that had a significant role in domestic 
propaganda, with regard to four crucial events from 1937 to 
1945. The following six points are specifically studied: 
(1) techniques employed in news stories to arouse the 
public's mind with emotional stimuli; (2) slant of headlines 
and stories; (3) number and variety of information sources 
cited in news stories; (4) attitudes reflected by stories 
toward the enemies and the Axis allies; (5) number of strong 
negative words or statements; and (6) categories of any 
propaganda emphases employed by the writers of news stories. 
In addition to the quantitative study, qualitative 
analysis will be used to illustrate through example the 
propaganda techniques that were employed in these three 
5 
Japanese newspapers to whip up and sustain public support 
for the war effort even after the U.S. air raids on the 
Japanese home land, when the inevitability of defeat became 
increasingly apparent to the public. 
6 
ENDNOTES 
1. Asahi Shinbun. evening ed., 8 December 1941, 1. 
2. Lafe F. Allen, "Effect of Allied Occupation on the Press 
of Japan," Journalism Quarterly 24 (December 1947): 324. 
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II. JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC CONFLICT, 1931-1945 
After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan had sought a 
dramatic modernization by following European culture, 
especially that of Germany, Great Britain, and France. 
Since the nation had adhered to a national policy of 
isolation for over three hundred years, it was much behind 
the modern development of the Western countries, and the 
more the Japanese gained the knowledge about those far 
wealthier powers, the more they felt a fear that those great 
powers would take over the small country. Once they had 
themselves modernized, they began to extend their power and 
control over the vast underdeveloped regions of China and 
Korea, which had a large population and abundant natural 
resources. 
Successive victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894- 
1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) contributed 
significantly to the misconception that the country was 
protected by "Divine Wind," which later became the name of 
the suicide attack by air fighters, "Kamikaze." In fact, 
these victories were almost certainly caused more by inner 
conflicts in China and Russia than by the superiority of the 
Japanese military power. But the government did not provide 
detailed information of the actual situations because it 
preferred to allow to flourish its imperialistic ideology 
within the nation. Also, the defeat of Germany by Britain, 
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France, and the United States in World War I made a great 
impression on the Japanese people's mind, namely that the 
modernized, industrialized powers of the West might conquer 
the whole world—including Japan. 
There were at least four inner strains in Japan after 
World War I that kept the wish for territorial expansion 
alive: (1) tremendous population growth; (2) lack of natural 
resources necessary to expand the development of new 
industries; (3) increase of domestic labor costs; and (4) 
limitation of the Japanese exports to foreign countries 
caused by the worldwide depression of the 1930s.1 Since the 
development of industries depended heavily on imports of raw 
materials, especially oil, from foreign countries, and on 
exports of products to those countries, the depression 
brought about a serious economic crisis in the nation.2 To 
overcome such difficult conditions, the government, which 
was already dominated by the army and navy representatives, 
decided to invade China by way of Manchuria in 1931, to 
create its own colony under the Japanese regime. This was a 
beginning of the effort to extend the realm of Japan's 
Empire through military, as well as economic imperialism. 
On September 18, 1931, the Manchurian railway near 
Mukden was blown up, and the Japanese army used this 
incident as a pretext for seizing all of Manchuria.* The 
Kwantung Army quickly—and without orders from Tokyo—swept 
through Manchuria, driving the Chinese all the way back to 
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their homeland. For the Japanese, Manchuria was a vast, 
undeveloped region containing abundant natural resources 
which could assist the future development of the homeland. 
The Manchurian development drive involved opening mines and 
starting iron and steel industries once Japan had separated 
Manchuria from China's influence. 
The next plan of the Kwantung Army was to establish a 
new political regime in Manchuria with the last emperor of 
the Ch'ing dynasty, Henry Pu-yi, as its figurehead. Despite 
its initial opposition to the plan, Tokyo finally approved 
in the face of widespread and growing nationalism and 
expansionism among the public opinion. Fearing that too 
much suppression on such emotions would cause both 
militaristic and civilian anti-government movements and 
destroy the whole political system, the government 
established Manchukuo, Japan's first colony, on March 1, 
1932. 
The next serious incident occurred at the night of July 
7, 1937, just outside of Peking when some Chinese soldiers 
fired on a company of Japanese soldiers on the Marco Polo 
Bridge. After a brief exchange of fire, a Japanese soldier 
was missing. The commander of the troops advanced on a 
Chinese fort and demanded to search it for their missing 
* In the cases of the events that occurred in China, the 
Chinese time and dates are used. 
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comrade. When the Chinese commander refused, the Japanese 
started shelling the fort. Thus, what began as an accident 
escalated into a major conflict between the Chinese and 
Japanese military. As a result, both countries entered a 
state of war. 
When the Japanese government demanded an apology and 
offered terms of peace, General Chiang Kai-shek, ruler of 
China, insisted instead that invaders withdraw from the 
whole of China. Tokyo was outraged by his reaction and sent 
military divisions to North China, under the pretext of 
protecting "true peace based on international justice."3 
The Japanese army swiftly occupied Peking and Tientsin, 
winning a rapid series of battles in northern China. Japan 
simultaneously extended the fighting from Peking in North 
China to Shanghai in Central China and decided to get rid of 
Chiang and replace him with a more accommodating leader. 
For this purpose, Tokyo planned the capture of Nanking. 
By this time, the Japanese government had already 
entered a state of war readiness, having established an 
Imperial Headquarters as the highest authority on strategic 
matters in the expanded conflict. However, the government 
did not officially declare war against China because it 
feared that such a declaration would activate America's 
Neutrality Act and result in a suspension of trade. Since 
Japan relied on American exports for much of the basic raw 
materials for its war effort, including scrap iron and 
11 
petroleum, discord with America would cause serious trouble 
for Japan's progress in China. The basic presumption of the 
Konoe cabinet was that America would not pay much attention 
to Japan's invasion of China as long as the direct 
relationship between the two countries was peaceful.4 
The presumption was wrong. The U.S. government, from 
the beginning of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, had assumed 
that Tokyo intended ultimately to colonize China.5 Strong 
negative attitudes toward Japan were increasingly growing 
within the United States. Economic sanctions against Japan 
were seriously considered, but postponed in the face of 
growing concern over the European situation.6 However, 
Washington's passivity toward Japan changed dramatically 
after Japan's assault on a U.S. gunboat in the Yangtze 
River. 
On December 11, 1937, three Japanese fighter planes 
attacked the U.S. gunboat Panay and three nearby Chinese 
tankers.7 The Panay was sunk. Two Americans on the Panay 
and a considerable number of the Chinese crewmen aboard the 
tankers were killed. 
The next day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed 
his "shock and concern." Although the Japanese Foreign 
Minister immediately offered apologies, with the acceptance 
of full responsibility for the incident, it raised the 
spectre in Washington that the Japanese invasion and 
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occupation of China would turn out to be a major threat 
against America. 
This impression was reinforced by the fact that, in 
Central China, Japanese reinforcements had been arriving, 
since August 1937, to launch an attack to capture Nanking, 
the capital of China. By December 7, Chiang Kai-shek had 
evacuated the capital and established a temporary capital in 
Hankow. The Japanese began to attack Nanking on December 9. 
After repelling hard counterattacks from the Chinese, 
Japanese troops rushed into the city and sealed the main 
gates, blocking all avenues of escape. Thousands of Chinese 
soldiers and citizens tried to escape, but were killed, or 
drowned in the Yangtze River, or captured. On December 12, 
the day after the Panay incident, Nanking was captured. 
While Japan was extending its reign over China, wide¬ 
spread aggression was continuing in Europe. Adolf Hitler's 
Germany invaded Poland in September, 1939, leading to a 
declaration of war against Germany by Britain and France. 
Germany's military success continued, and France finally 
fell in June, 1940. 
Initially, many Japanese leaders had resisted forming 
any strong alliance with Germany because they feared that it 
would create enemies for Tokyo in London and Washington.8 
Navy representatives were particularly opposed to this idea, 
recognizing that the superiority of sea power of the Allies 
to that of Germany and Italy. As a result of this 
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confusion, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro resigned in 
January, 1939, to be replaced by more hawkish leaders. 
Germany's easy victories made Japan assume that the 
Axis Powers would conquer all Europe. In addition, the 
collapse of Paris orphaned French Indochina and the Dutch 
East Indies, the richest colonies in Southeast Asia. At the 
same time, Germany's land successes in Europe sapped British 
power in the Far East by causing London to order its fleet 
from Singapore back to the defense of the homeland. This 
power vacuum seemed a perfect opportunity for Japan to 
expand its territory on the grounds that, if those areas, 
which had oil, rubber, nickel, and other important resources 
necessary for wartime, were not grabbed quickly, they would 
be seized either by the United States or even Germany. 
When Konoe Fumimaro was chosen to serve as prime 
minister for the second time in July 1940, the government 
positively embraced the idea of the Tripartite Pact as a 
part of a three-stage policy to secure Southeast Asia from 
outsiders.9 First, the Tokyo-Berlin-Rome Axis should be 
strengthened. This was to be followed by nonaggression pact 
with the Soviet Union. Finally, positive actions should be 
taken to annex the Asian colonies of England, France, and 
Holland within a new, Japanese-led order. Step one, the 
Tripartite Act, was signed on September 27, 1940.10 The 
Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact was concluded on April 14, 
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1941.* This effectively allowed Tokyo and Russia to turn 
their attentions to other concerns. 
The military alliance of Japan with Germany and Italy 
shocked the U.S. government, and for the first time, the 
United States began to contemplate the possibility of war 
with Tokyo. This was manifested by the creation of economic 
sanctions against Japan and the beginning of serious 
planning for the possible use of U.S. armed forces in the 
Pacific area.11 
The Japanese government did not intend to risk war with 
the United States, despite Tokyo's alliance with the Axis 
powers. Japan was still struggling to secure China and was 
not prepared to fight with America, which possessed the 
strongest navy in the world. However, in spite of Tokyo's 
desire to avoid a conflict with the United States, 
negotiations between the two countries stagnated. U.S. 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded Japan's withdrawal 
from the Tripartite Alliance. If Japan refused this demand, 
he said, there was no place for further negotiation. Japan 
stood at a crucial turning point.12 
When Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June, 
1941, resulted in early initial gains, Japan finally made up 
its mind. Assuming that the European war would soon end 
* The dates of the signing of the Tripartite Act and the 
Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact refer to Berlin and Moscow 
dates, respectively. 
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with Germany's victory, the Japanese army advanced swiftly 
through the Chinese countryside. Responding to this 
invasion, the U.S. government banned the export of oil to 
Japan and froze all its assets in America. Since Japan was 
heavily dependent on imported oil from the U.S., the Konoe 
government had to make a decision—either surrender or 
obtain oil by taking the Dutch East Indies, an act that 
would mean war. Because of the pressure to establish a 
deadline for making the decision, Konoe resigned in October. 
His successor as prime minister was former War Minister 
T5j5 Hideki. He continued efforts to restore U.S.-Japan 
relationships, but the situation was already beyond his 
control. On November 26, 1941, the U.S. government sent 
Tokyo a ten-point note demanding that Tokyo leave the 
Tripartite Pact, support only Chiang's authority in China, 
and withdraw all its troops from the whole of China and 
Indochina.*13 In Tokyo, the government interpreted these 
demands as a virtual declaration of war. From this moment, 
it hastily began to prepare for a Pacific War, beginning 
with a pre-emptive strike. 
On December 7, 1941, the U.S. naval base at Pearl 
Harbor was attacked without a declaration of war. The 
damage inflicted by the Japanese force on the U.S. Pacific 
* For all the dates of the U.S. governmental actions and the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Washington time and dates 
are used. 
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Fleet was tremendous: Five battleships, three destroyers, 
one minelayer, and one aircraft carrier were sunk; two other 
battleships, four cruisers, and smaller ships were severely 
damaged. Almost 200 airplanes were shot down or destroyed 
before they took off. A total of 2,403 Americans died in 
the attack. On the other hand, Japan lost only 29 planes 
and 55 pilots.14 
On the afternoon of December 8, President Roosevelt 
asked a special joint session of the House and Senate for an 
immediate declaration of war against Japan. For its part, 
the Japanese government declared that it had acted in self- 
defense and appealed for the liberation of Asia, without 
comment on its violation of the provisions of the Hague 
Convention of 1907.15 Hostilities between the two countries 
began, with Japan now fully committed to fulfilling its 
dream of expanding its realm to Southeast Asia. 
During the early period of the war, the Japanese 
advance was largely successful. From December 1941 to May 
1942, their armies occupied Hong Kong (December 25), Rabaul 
(January 23), Sumatra (February 15), Singapore (February 
15), Java (March 5), Rangoon (March 8), and the Philippines 
(May 27).* Also, Borneo, Celebes, Burma and the Andamans 
fell under control of the army. The Imperial Air Force 
* For all the dates of the capture of the Eastern and 
Southern Asian islands, the spot dates are used. 
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raided Ceylon and Port Darwin, Australia, and the Japanese 
navy gained successive victories in the Java Straits and the 
Indian Ocean. 
In those occupied Southeast Asian regions, the Japanese 
army persuaded the leaders of local governments to cooperate 
with it by promising that the rights of native leaders would 
be protected under Japanese leadership. This action was 
important for the army to gain support from the natives, 
although there was no intention but to create pro-Japanese 
governments that would be subjugated to the Japanese regime. 
Flushed with these successive victories, the navy 
proposed invasions of Hawaii and Australia, but these plans 
were blocked by the strong opposition of the army. This 
revealed, for the first time, disagreements between the army 
and navy in their strategies.16 The army's long-range plan 
was to build up the various battle fronts, to strengthen the 
occupation of conquered territories, to increase levels of 
military production, and to wait for the fall of Britain and 
the weakening of America's determination in the Pacific. On 
the other hand, the navy urged a more aggressive policy of 
conquering the entire area from the Pacific to the Indian 
Ocean—that is, dividing the world between Japan and 
Germany. Since the navy also recognized that the United 
States had a significant edge in industrial power, it 
favored pressing ahead quickly. Tokyo realized as early as 
18 
1942 that the longer the war lasted, the greater the 
possibility that Japan would be defeated. 
The navy carried the day and the Japanese government 
approved the attack of Midway Island, in an attempt to bring 
the U.S. navy into a crucial early battle while the 
advantage of the Pacific area was in the hands of the 
Japanese. 
The Japanese advanced on Midway with the most 
formidable battle ever assembled up to that time. Admiral 
Yamamoto not only believed that the Americans were at least 
1,200 miles away, but that they had no idea that a surprise 
attack was about to be launched. Unfortunately for the 
Japanese, the Americans had cracked the Japanese naval code 
and knew precisely what to expect. As a result, the United 
States not only had its fleet in position, but also caught 
the Japanese advance naval force completely by surprise on 
June 4, 1942.* By the time Admiral Yamamoto's main force 
fleet arrived to engage the enemy, the U.S. fleet had 
destroyed four Japanese aircraft carriers and all the 
airplanes based on them and had withdrawn out of reach.17 
The result was an overwhelming defeat, not only for Japan, 
but also for the influence of the Japanese naval high 
command. For the next three years, Tokyo suffered a string 
of successive defeats until surrender in 1945. 
* The date of the Battle of Midway refers to the spot time. 
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The situation created by the defeat at Midway was 
compounded two months later when the United States struck at 
Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Although the heavily 
outnumbered Japanese forces held out for six months, they 
inevitably had to withdraw in February 1943. This second 
major setback was followed two months later by the death of 
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, who was not only commander-in¬ 
chief of the combined fleet, but who had been a symbol of 
navy strength from the beginning of the war. 
Not only did the military situation grow steadily worse 
for Japan, so did the economic situation. By autumn of 
1943, total tonnage of shipping had fallen to one million 
tons—or one third of the minimum required to sustain the 
war effort.18 The production of aircraft dramatically 
increased, but the quality was poor because of a lack of raw 
materials. In addition, heavy losses of elite pilots at the 
Battle of Midway and poor training of inexperienced 
replacement pilots resulted in equally heavy losses of those 
new airplanes. At the same time, the United States 
increased its production of ships and aircraft. Although 
the Japanese government had anticipated this, no one had 
realized the full extent of America's industrial 
superiority. 
The tide had now turned completely against Japan. A 
devastating blow occurred in June 1944, when 65,000 Japanese 
soldiers—42 percent of its total garrison—died in an 
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attempt to retreat from Burma during the monsoons. A month 
later, the island of Saipan fell and in October 1944, the 
U.S. launched its successful offensive to retake the 
Philippines. ■LJ After the fall of Guam, Japanese civilians 
got their first taste of war in an air raid on Tokyo on 
November 1, 1944.* Hitherto unaware of the reality of war, 
the Japanese people now became acutely aware that it was 
possible for the U.S. air force to attack their homeland 
directly. 
With a growing fear of defeat, the government organized 
Kamikaze dive bomber units piloted by young men who pledged 
to stay with their planes until it hit their targets. But 
it was too little and too late. In March 1945, after nearly 
two months of fighting, Iwo Jima fell to the enemy; Manila 
had already fallen in February, followed by Rangoon in May. 
Meanwhile, U.S. troops completed the capture of Okinawa in 
June 1945, making it much easier for B-29 bombers to attack 
the Japanese homeland. 
The Japanese government now found itself being urged to 
make a major decision—either surrender or continue the war. 
During the preceding seven months, about 757,000 Japanese, 
including soldiers and civilians, had died.20 Production of 
iron and steel was one third of the yearly target, and this 
* Tokyo time and dates are used for all the events that 
occurred within Japan's homeland. 
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figure was expected to drop to zero by the following April 
because of the shortage of aluminum. Stocks of petroleum 
were running out and vessels of the navy were mixing soybean 
oil with the heavy oil they used. Hitler's Germany had 
already surrendered on May 7. The Soviet Union was sending 
forces to the Far East and was expected to be in the 
position to launch an invasion of Manchuria by September. 
Most importantly, there was no hope of winning the war. 
On July 26, the Allied leaders at Potsdam issued a 
declaration, calling for the immediate surrender of the 
Japanese armed forces.*21 The government ignored the 
declaration. Shortly thereafter, on August 6, the U.S. air 
force dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, followed three 
days later by a similar attack on Nagasaki. An estimated 
140,000 persons perished in the two attacks. Confronted by 
this devastating loss of life, as well as a declaration of 
war against Japan by the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Suzuki 
Kantaro proposed acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.22 
But the army and navy were strongly opposed to the word 
"unconditional," insisting that the acceptance of the 
declaration be postponed until they would gain some 
victories in battles and improve the condition of surrender. 
Through these confused debates, Suzuki finally decided to 
* The dates of the events occurring in Europe refer to the 
European time. 
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ask Emperor Hirohito for a final conclusion. The Emperor's 
decision was to end the war as soon as possible. On the 
afternoon of August 15, Japanese radio broadcast the 
Emperor's statement that Japan had accepted the 
unconditional surrender. That was the moment when the long- 
sought dream ended and a new period of reality started. 
Before and during the Pacific War, the Japanese 
government successfully controlled the press as an effective 
instrument for its propagation. The coverage of domestic 
newspapers was filled with flashy victory stories, and no 
detailed information about defeats in the battles was 
provided. The Japanese people were kept ignorant of reality 
and educated to blindly support the war effort with 
patriotism and national enthusiasm. The military success in 
early stages of the war was mainly attributed to this 
nation-wide public support. 
In the following chapter, the Japanese press, 
especially its relationship with the government, will be 
discussed in detail. The main questions are: How, 
historically, did the government perceive the role of the 
press in society? How did the government control the press? 
What kinds of censorship regulations were created by the 
government? How did the press respond to such state 
controls? And what were the primary techniques it used for 
war propaganda? In addition to these points, some 
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implications about press performance will be included in 
the chapter. 
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III. EMERGENCE OF THE JAPANESE PRESS, 1868-1945 
In western history texts, modern Japan is dated from 
the arrival of Commodore Perry in Edo Bay in 1853 and the 
subsequent treaty of Kanagawa that opened two ports, 
permitted trade under regulations, and led to improved 
treatment of American castaways. In fact, the modernization 
that followed was, to a large extent, a superimposition of 
western values over a culture whose roots dated back at 
least 1,200 years and whose origins were imbued in a social 
organization that emphasized the virtue of the clan chief 
and, subsequently, the emperor. The system was, above all, 
hierarchical, with absolute power residing with the imperial 
clan leader, who, in turn, derived his power from a divine 
entity.1 
Within this centuries-old structure, the concept of 
newspapers was almost totally alien. Even more far-fetched 
were the notions of freedom of speech and the press. On the 
contrary, the prerogatives of feudal war lords were a far 
more dominant influence. 
It was only during the later Tokugawa period in the 
mid-1800s that the emergence of merchant and middle classes 
in the cities created an interest among the literate in news 
and information. Even so, no newspapers existed, partly 
because the rulers preferred it that way and partly because 
there was no such tradition. In fact, the first modern 
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daily newspaper appeared only in 1870—180 years after 
Publick Occurrences was first published in the American 
colonies. 
Perhaps the most important event in the evolution of 
newspapers in Japan was the military uprising against the 
Tokugawa regime and its replacement in 1868 by the Meiji 
Emperor, who established a political system that sought to 
modernize the political, economic and cultural systems of 
the country. This movement, operating under the slogan 
"enlightenment and civilization," brought about a 
communication revolution with the introduction and 
proliferation of printed periodicals that rapidly attracted 
a public audience eager for information, especially about 
the outside world. 
Fifteen months after the Meiji government was 
established, the Press Publication Ordinance was issued that 
freed newspapers from the Tokugawa government's system of 
prior censorship, under which no one could publish a 
newspaper without official permission. Under the new 
regime, publishers were required only to submit two copies 
of each issue of their papers to the government immediately 
upon publication. If anything in the paper was deemed 
harmful to the state—such as "irresponsible attacks" on the 
government or something disturbing public morals—then the 
publication could be put out of business. There was, 
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however, no clear statement of punishments for writers, 
editors or publishers under this law.2 
In introducing the new publication law, the government 
encouraged and promoted newspapers intended for a general 
audience. This effort was not so much based on any 
philosophical endorsement of freedom of the press as it was 
the government's belief that it needed vehicles in which to 
propagate its own policies in order to create a public 
movement toward "national unity." 
It was in this environment that general-circulation, 
modern newspapers gained a foothold and even flourished in 
Japan, beginning in 1870 with Yokohama Mainichi Shinbun. 
which was founded by a wealthy merchant through an 
intermediary of the government. Six more newspapers were 
founded in the next two years. All were published in major 
cities and most were "patronage papers" that prospered from 
government support. Since the term "patronage" indicated 
power and prestige, and therefore, suggested that a paper 
was "accurate and dependable," the publishers and editors 
utilized such a position to expand circulations and to 
attract advertisers. In exchange, they embraced the 
government's plans and policies and propagated its points of 
view about the need to modernize the nation.3 
However, this intimate relationship between the 
government and the press did not last long. Beginning in 
January 1874, the Popular Rights Movement spread over the 
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nation, calling for the creation of a popularly elected 
assembly. Many newspapers supported this idea and began to 
criticize the government for its centralized monarchy. The 
drastic change in newspaper coverage stimulated the public's 
interest in the issue, and the Japanese people became more 
willing to pay attention to newspaper reports. 
This new nation-wide movement divided newspapers into 
two groups: One was the progressive papers that discarded 
the prestige of "patronage paper" and supported the movement 
for popular rights. The other was those that kept 
conservative attitudes and followed government policies.4 
The majority of papers belonged to the former group. 
Embarrassed by the harsh words used in the articles of 
anti-state newspapers, the government issued the new Press 
Ordinance (June 28, 1875) and the revised Publication 
Ordinance (September 3, 1875), both of which were more 
specific and tougher than earlier regulations. The Press 
Ordinance contained clear statements regarding penalties and 
administrative procedure for preventing publication. For 
example, Article 13 provided that "Anyone advocating a 
revolution against the government or the subversion of the 
state, or who attempts to stir up rebellion is liable to 
imprisonment for not less than one year and not more than 
three...."5 Likewise, the revised Publication Ordinance 
introduced detailed punishments and more strict inspection 
of manuscripts, as well as forms of post-censorship. 
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By the end of 1876, more than 60 journalists had been 
arrested for violations of the new laws. By 1880, over 300 
had been fined or jailed, most of whom were charged with 
libel or slander.6 In the early 1880s, when the Popular 
Rights Movement reached its peak, 144 issues of periodicals 
were suspended. Because of such a strict enforcement of 
censorship laws by the government, this period is known as 
the "reign of terror" in Japanese journalism history. 
In 1889, the government issued the Great Japan Imperial 
(Meiji) Constitution, which opened with the statement that 
"The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a 
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line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal." This 
constitution stated that "Japanese subjects shall, within 
the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, 
publication, public meetings and association."® However, 
this concept of "liberty" was based on the prior press and 
publication regulations, and the press performance was 
always subject to government censorship. As one scholar 
mentioned: "Phrases such as 'within the limits of law' 
illustrate that the new rule by law did not absolutely 
guarantee civil rights."9 This treatment of the press by 
the government in the Meiji constitution remained in effect 
until the creation of the new Press Law of 1909. 
Experiencing such strict, but ambiguous regulations, 
the Japanese press struggled to identify its role in the 
changing society. In the 1890s, it evolved from its role as 
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"party press" and gradually shifted its emphasis from 
political reports to general news. At the same time, the 
press had to reconstruct its financial structure from a non¬ 
commercial to a commercial basis. All newspaper 
organizations, except a few "patronage papers," needed to 
survive by increasing their circulation and attracting 
advertisers. 
The next phase saw these papers fighting against 
political abuse or conducting campaigns for the improvement 
of living conditions and the solution of social problems— 
the press crusade. The main theme of this "campaign- 
journalism" was to criticize the government by carrying 
exposees, especially those concerning scandals involving 
high officials. Since these thoroughly investigated, 
sensational newspapers also sold at a low price (as did the 
"penny press" in the United States), they greatly appealed 
to the interest of the lower classes. As a result, the 
"campaign" papers successfully increased their circulation. 
Moreover, two great conflicts, the Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), 
contributed to the development of newspaper business by 
providing stimulating news reports. The government applied 
rigid press censorship on all news items connected with the 
military. However, those large papers that could afford to 
send their own war correspondents and resources to battle 
fields assumed greater prominence with their special reports 
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and extra editions than other papers. Even so, these 
"factual" reports were generally manipulated by military 
commanders and tended to exaggerate heroic actions of 
Japanese soldiers. The intensity of sensationalism, 
combined with official censorship, whipped public opinion 
into a warlike mood and suppressed a handful of anti-war 
activists.10 
After the Russo-Japanese War, the development of 
commercialism in the newspaper business heightened the 
competition among papers in the marketplace. The stronger, 
well-financed papers began to purchase weak competitors and 
acquire their circulations and advertising bases. This 
pattern made them stronger and more able to compete with the 
other strong papers left in the market. Also, drastic 
changes in the structure of newspaper organizations 
appeared, and writers and editors were more systematically 
organized by new management systems. As a result, the 
concept of the newspaper business changed from a business 
concerned with "dissemination of original ideas" by a 
thought group to an "information business" controlled by a 
well-organized corporation.11 
Along with this movement, the press began to protest 
against the government's political and economic controls 
over the newspaper business. This opposition was triggered 
on May 6, 1909, when the government issued the revised Press 
Law and enforced repressive aspects of earlier laws and 
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regulations. It gave the Home Minister the power to 
prohibit the sale and distribution of periodicals and to 
seize them in cases where they disturbed public peace and 
morals.12 There was no way for the press legally to fight 
against the Minister's completely unchecked censorship 
power. Moreover, punishments of "irresponsible” writers and 
editors were strengthened. This Press Law continued to be 
the basis of press regulations until the end of World War II 
in 1945. 
When the new Press Law was unanimously passed by the 
Diet in 1909, the newspaper industry harshly criticized the 
government, calling for the protection of individual rights 
and freedom of speech. At that time, many journalists 
argued that the development of democratic political and 
economic systems in Japan was being disturbed by the 
monarchy of the ruling clique which had dominated the top 
offices since the Meiji Restoration. 
As a result, some newspapers decided to conduct 
campaigns for overthrowing the ruling clique and creating 
democratic party-politics.13 Although these campaigns 
gained much support from the public and successfully forced 
some cabinets to dissolve, the ruling clique maintained its 
power until the appearance of the first party government in 
1918. This government was soon dominated by the police and 
military and continued to maintain a strong grip over the 
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press during the "time of national crisis" in the 1920s and 
1930s. 
Even so, the periodical press grew tremendously in size 
and quality between 1920 and 1932. The number of newspapers 
and magazines registered under the Press Law of 1909 rose 
from 3,123 to 11,118 during this period.14 A handful of 
daily newspapers evolved into national opinion leaders, 
creating a growing and better-educated middle-class 
readership. Ownership patterns changed as corporate 
operations were promoted, and major press organizations 
acquired greater professionalism and prestige. 
In terms of press policies, the government employed 
some powerful legal and extra-legal weapons to regulate 
press activities.15 First, it could suspend publication of 
journals for procedural violations, such as failure to 
report the intent to publish a specific story. Secondly, it 
had the power to ban the circulation of specific editions 
violating censorship standards. Both of these devices were 
already established by the Press Law of 1909. Thirdly, it 
created an informal post-publication warning system for 
books and magazines to prevent objectionable comments in 
future articles. At the same time, it allowed a publisher 
still to sell his paper after deleting objectionable 
material. In this way he avoided the full financial injury 
of a ban on circulation. 
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Most importantly, the government created the pre¬ 
publication system of control over newspapers because there 
was no effective way of preventing newspapers from 
circulating copies of "offensive" articles after 
publication. This system, called a "consultation approach," 
included four types of orders that could be given to a 
publisher when any "improper" statements or topics were 
found: (1) embargoes, which prohibited publishers from 
writing about certain specifically forbidden topics; (2) 
warnings; (3) deletions of entire passages; and (4) the 
dismemberment and restitution of seized publications.16 
Furthermore, there were three forms of pre-publication 
warnings: instructions. in which a violation would result in 
a ban on circulation if anything was published on a specific 
subject related to public order; admonitions, in which a 
violation would probably bring a ban on circulation, 
depending on the social situation and the nature of the 
article; consultations. in which case publication would not 
be punished, but a moral appeal was made not to report the 
event.17 These warnings were frequently used for newspaper 
coverage that was not based on official press releases. The 
result of these warnings was to help convert the press into 
an agent of national unity, at the expense of any criticism 
or commentary on government policies. 
In addition to these legal and extra-legal devices, the 
government issued the Peace Preservation Law on May 12, 
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1925. The main purpose of this law was to suppress growing 
radical movements of socialists, communists, and anarchists. 
For example, Article 1 stated that "Anyone who has organized 
an association with the objective of altering the national 
unity or the form of government or denying the system of 
private property.... shall be liable to imprisonment with or 
without hard labor for a term not exceeding ten years."18 
At the same time, this regulation created another obstacle 
for press freedom because it made actions by advocates of an 
outlawed ideology subject to criminal punishments. The fact 
that the standard of ideological motive was set by this law 
meant that police and justice officials were entering a new 
area of "thought control" by the government. 
In the 1930s, the nation experienced several incidents 
that brought about the rapid growth of militarism and 
fascism in the political world and resulted in even closer 
scrutiny of the press. In May 1932, military extremist 
officers killed Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi because they 
did not think his government had been aggressive enough 
toward the overthrow of China. This assassination ended the 
party-government system that had lasted for 14 years and 
that had represented a kind of high-water mark in the 
evolution of the Japanese press. Unfortunately for the 
nation—and newspapers—the result was to play into the 
hands of the more aggressive military leaders, who now 
assumed a much greater political role. Their grip over the 
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government and the nation was strengthened in February 1936 
when military units assassinated the last remaining 
prominent civilian government officials—also on the grounds 
that they had been dragging their feet with regard to the 
Sino-Japanese War in particular and "The Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere" in general.19 
Under these repressive conditions, the Japanese press 
changed its role from a "leader of liberal movements" to an 
instrument for the governmental propagation of national 
unity. Before the Manchurian incident in 1931, the press 
often criticized the growing militarism within the 
government and urged a peaceful foreign policy. But, with 
the ascension of military influence in the government came 
increased attacks on the press from bureaucrats, aggressive 
politicians, and public pressure groups, as well as the 
military. Statements criticizing military actions or 
expenditures disappeared from press coverage, because such 
stories might result in disadvantages for diplomatic 
negotiations or disturb the promotion of absolute harmony 
and unity as a necessary step in solving vexatious external 
problems.20 The government and military rigidly controlled 
the press as an effective medium for mobilizing the public 
mind toward national unity. Also, the new medium of radio 
broadcasting, which was monopolized by centralized NHK 
(Nippon Hdso Kyokai, Japan Broadcasting Association), was 
subject to official prior censorship controls.21 
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Some studies related to banning orders against the 
press during this period illustrate how pre-publication 
censorship was strengthened.22 For example, the Home 
Minister issued a banning order 238 times between 1929 and 
1935. The "consultation," which was the weakest of the 
three types of warnings, disappeared after 1933, and the 
"instruction," which was the most severe, dramatically 
increased from 1932 onwards. This shows that the government 
became more sensitive about press coverage after the 
Manchurian incident of late 1931. Other statistics show 
that prohibitions of sales and distribution because of 
alleged violations of public peace and morals peaked between 
1932 and 1933. Prohibitions of magazines, foreign 
publications, and leftist legal publications followed the 
same pattern. The number of prosecutions in court shows a 
different pattern, but it gradually increased from 1931 to 
1935 (360 in 1931, 454 in 1933, and 478 in 1935). Thus, 
throughout the decade of the 1930s, the Japanese government 
strengthened its censorship systems—both pre-and post¬ 
publication—in its effort to create and maintain total 
public support for its aggressive foreign policies. 
As tensions escalated between Japan and China, the 
United States, and Great Britain, Tokyo launched yet another 
effort to reorganize and regulate press structures and 
institutions to insure its full cooperation in case of war. 
This involved four specific areas of control: (1) the 
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creation of a united, centralized news agency; (2) the 
establishment of information institutions within the 
government; (3) the consolidation of the newspaper business; 
and (4) the press coverage under such controls. 
Since the Manchurian incident in 1931, the government 
had suffered from the harsh criticism from the outside 
world. Because Japanese leaders did not want to be involved 
in conflicts with any countries except China, they tried to 
keep peaceful relationships by resolving diplomatic 
tensions. However, a lack of coordination in official 
information output among government institutions and the 
military caused difficulties in those diplomatic 
negotiations. Government leaders realized that it was 
urgent to create a centralized state news agency which would 
provide consistent official information and propaganda for 
. • ? 1 foreign countries. 
There were two major wire service agencies at that 
time: the Dentsu Agency, which had a tie-up with the United 
Press, and the Reng5 Agency, which depended on the 
Associated Press and Reuters. These two agencies responded 
differently to the government proposition of unification. 
Rengo, a financially weak non-profit company whose employees 
worked without pay, agreed with the proposition, offering 
its facilities free of charge. On the other hand, Dentsu, a 
profit-making company, opposed the amalgamation, fearing 
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that a state agency would dominate and control the flow of 
information. 
The Foreign and Communications Ministers finally 
authorized creation of the United News Agency (Domei) in 
November 1935 without Dentsu's participation. The state 
agency was mainly financed by NHK (Japan Broadcasting 
Association), which monopolized the domestic broadcasting 
system. In December 1935, the Communication Ministry 
decreed new regulations reguiring a ministry permit to 
transmit or receive international broadcasts or telegrams. 
This was an action against Dentsu, because permits were 
granted exclusively to the United News Agency, terminating 
Dentsu's services. On May 31, 1936, Dentsu finally agreed 
to surrender its news dispatch operations to the United News 
Agency. 
Thus, an agent of state policy was established, as the 
government had desired. It was designed to disseminate 
information in accord with official views. Its ultimate 
goal was to win the "thought war" against AP, UP, Reuters, 
Tass, and other wire services and to acquire a dominant 
position in Asia.^ The operations of the United News 
Agency were under direct control of the Cabinet Information 
Committee that was established on July 1, 1936, as a 
centralized information bureau within the government. The 
main objectives were to manage all information regarding the 
work of individual offices, to deal with official 
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announcements of foreign and domestic information, to 
supervise censorship of publications, and to plan propaganda 
programs for government publicity.25 This committee was 
headed by the chief cabinet secretary, with membership from 
the Army, Navy, Home, Foreign, and Communications 
Ministries. It also directly controlled the United News 
Agency so that the agency could manipulate the public's 
understanding of the outside world in accord with the 
government's view. 
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict, this 
committee was expanded to the Cabinet Information Division 
on September 25, 1937, indicating the government's 
increasing determination to centralize and reorganize its 
censorship agencies. In addition to doubling the number of 
regular staff, the new division also appointed special 
advisors for various fields of the mass media. These 
advisors gave ideas for the planning of effective propaganda 
programs and standardizing wartime ideology. Moreover, the 
establishment of the new division was related to the 
government's intention of whipping up national enthusiasm 
for the China war. 
About six months later, on April 1, 1938, the 
government issued the National Mobilization Law to stir up 
and maintain the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement 
among the public. To promote this, the Cabinet Information 
Division pressed journalists to play a more positive role in 
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the war effort. This was embodied in a manifesto called 
"Guidance for Newspapers." According to this, writers and 
editors were admonished not to present too optimistic a 
picture of current affairs, to consider the impact of news 
upon Japanese soldiers, civilians, and foreign nations, and 
to shape public opinion favorable to the state. 
Specifically, it stated: No quick diplomatic solution should 
be suggested; German and Italian policies should receive 
favorable comments; Communism, which was the source of world 
disorder, should be attacked.26 Although these were 
"unofficial" standards without legal basis, the new division 
strictly enforced them against any journalists, with harsh 
punishments such as imprisonment, suspension, and fines. 
On December 6, 1940, the government converted the 
Cabinet Information Division to the Cabinet Information 
Bureau, a super agency whose scope and size were 
dramatically increased. It included the work of information 
divisions of the Army, Navy, Foreign, and Home Ministries, 
employing over 600 people from those ministries. The main 
purpose was to unify the censorship apparatus under the 
cabinet's direct supervision for achieving total control of 
mass media and other forms of public expression. There were 
five divisions in the bureau: (1) planning and 
investigation; (2) information (newspapers, magazines, 
books, and broadcasting); (3) overseas propaganda; (4) 
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censorship; and (5) domestic propaganda and culture. 
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The Cabinet Information Bureau was the ultimate form of 
the government information institution which unified all 
works for the total control of information. It was better- 
organized and more legally supported than earlier 
institutions. All communication systems were under the 
supervision of the bureau, and censorship regulations were 
strictly enforced. Under such conditions, press activities 
were greatly limited in news-gathering, reporting, and 
distribution. 
The press was now unable to survive without the 
services of the Cabinet Information Bureau, the United News 
Agency, and other centralized agencies. In addition, the 
growing national enthusiasm among the public for Japanese 
expansion made it difficult for any newspaper or editor to 
fight for freedom of expression. It would be fair to say 
that, by early 1941, the press had become a part of the 
government's propaganda machine. Because of this, the 
attack on Pearl Harbor and declaration of war by the United 
States had little impact on press coverage or attitudes: the 
journalists simply did as they were told or risked 
imprisonment. Beyond this, there was still work to be done 
by the government on the resources consumed by newspapers 
and other publications. These were severely regulated by 
the Newspaper Business Decree of December 13, 1941. The 
main objectives were to curtail competition in the market 
and to conserve scarce materials.28 In fact, this decree 
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granted government the authority to interfere with the 
entire management system of the newspaper business. 
This regulation organized newspapers into four 
groups:29 (1) three "majors," which were nation-wide papers 
published in Tokyo and Osaka; (2) four "block papers," which 
served in metropolitan regions; (3) 16 specialized papers, 
concerned with economy, electronics, transportation, 
farming, fishing, printing, etc.; and (4) 45 local papers, 
which were published only in each prefecture. 
First of all, the three leading dailies, the 
Mainichi/Nichi-Nichi chain, the Asahi, and the Yomiuri, were 
left in Tokyo as nation-wide newspapers. But five other big 
papers were forced either to sell out to the three giants or 
else to close their offices. For example, Hochi Shinbun. 
one of the majors, was acquired by Yomiuri Shinbun. and the 
merged paper was named Yomiuri-Hochi Shinbun. Kokumin 
Shinbun and Mivako Shinbun. which had long been opinion 
leaders known for their original thoughts and ideas, were 
closed after an attempted merger of the two papers failed. 
Instead, new Tokyo Shinbun was established as a "block 
paper." Shin-Aichi Shinbun and Naaova Shinbun were merged 
into Chubu-Nihon Shinbun. which was also admitted as a 
"block paper" by the government. 
Consequently, in addition to the three majors, the 
government allowed four papers, Chubu-Nihon Shinbun. Nishi- 
Nihon Shinbun. Tokyo Shinbun. and Osaka Shinbun. as "block 
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papers" in metropolitan cities. Thirdly, specialized, 
industrial papers were consolidated into 16 papers—one for 
each field, except the economy. Two of these were allowed, 
one published in Tokyo and the other in dsaka 150 miles to 
the south. Finally, local newspapers were consolidated 
under the slogan "one paper for one prefecture." This 
policy, established since 1937, was rapidly achieved in 
1942. As a result, even well-financed, influential local 
papers were forced to cease publication. The total number 
of daily newspapers declined from 848 in 1939 to just 60 in 
1942.28 
Although a certain amount of newspaper consolidation 
had been occurring before the war, by far the greatest 
impact on press size and performance from 1940 onwards was 
effected by the military-dominated government. A one-party 
state emerged and was codified in August, 1940 by the 
Imperial Rule Assistance Association. The effect of the 
creation of this single national party was to eliminate many 
local newspapers that had retained affiliation with (and 
some financial support from) the various political parties. 
Because the new law essentially eliminated party rivalries, 
it also created a uniformity of content in almost all 
Japanese newspapers.31 This, in turn, provided the 
government with a pretext for decreeing that each area 
should only be served by just one newspaper. 
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Punitive measures against newspapers and journalists 
were by 1941 so strong that there was no effective and safe 
way to oppose the consolidation of the press and the 
uniformity of thinking that was being demanded by the 
government. If a newspaper organization opposed the 
consolidation directives, police could confiscate the 
publication by force, no matter the legality of their 
actions. In addition, there was no impartial avenue of 
appeal open to persons victimized by the police. 
To make matters even easier for the government, a 
shortage of newsprint contributed further to the weakening 
of any independent voices within the press. In 1936, 
Japanese newspapers had consumed nearly 700 million pounds 
of newsprint—of which 139 million was imported. From 1939 
onwards, paper imports dramatically decreased, dropping to 
zero after the beginning of the Pacific War in 1941. By 
1945, newsprint consumption had dropped to about 160 million 
pounds—or 23 percent of the 1936 total.32 
The control and distribution of newsprint was in the 
hands of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which 
provided another means by which a newspaper could be brought 
into line if it strayed in its support for the regime and 
the war. But, given all of the other controls, the impact 
of the shortage of newsprint was less political than it was 
practical. The size and frequency of newspapers were 
greatly affected by the paper shortage. For example, in 
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1937 major daily newspapers generally published 20-page 
papers for both morning and evening editions. The number of 
pages for each edition dropped to 16 in 1938, then to 12 in 
1939 and to six in 1941 (with just two pages for evening 
editions). By 1942, the average size for all newspapers was 
four pages. Two years later, all newspapers were forced to 
abolish evening editions and could publish only two-page 
. . . 1 1 
morning editions. J
The war also had a serious impact on advertising and 
content. Space for advertisements dramatically decreased 
from the mid-1930s when about 30 percent of available space 
was sold. After the beginning of the Pacific War, 
advertising lineage dropped to 20 percent and then to just 
10 percent from 1944 until the end of the war.34 At the 
same time, non-war related news suffered the same fate, 
according to content analyses. Particularly affected were 
entertainment, women's stories, cartoons, and weather 
reports.35 
Human interest stories, crime news and domestic 
disaster reports were replaced by food-related information 
covering such topics as distribution, nutrition and 
gardening methods.36 Space devoted to foreign news that was 
not war-related was limited, too, not only by lack of space, 
but also by the difficulty of gathering the information. 
Most foreign news during the war was transmitted through the 
United News Agency, which got its information by monitoring 
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other wire services. Only the giant papers could send their 
own correspondents to foreign countries. Even so, the 
locations of these correspondents were severely restricted 
because of the world-wide crisis. A study of the foreign 
dispatches during the war showed the following:37 
Berlin 26.6% Buenos Aires 8.2% 
Lisbon 20.6% Shanghai 3.7% 
Stockholm 12.0% Moscow 2.6% 
Zurich 8.8% Other 17.5% 
A handful of Japanese writers did oppose the state and 
its war aims in spite of the strict controls over the press. 
Some of the more noteworthy opponents of the regime were 
Kiryu Yuyu, Masaki Hiroshi, Kikutake Rokko, Nakano Seigo and 
Shinmyo Takeo.38 The targets of their criticisms ranged 
from individual politicians to the entire military and the 
fanaticism of the public. None of them were allowed to 
write for long. In extreme cases, some of these opponents 
killed themselves after being denounced as "traitors" to the 
nation. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that few other journalists risked any public opposition to 
the government during the war. 
Most journalists simply did their jobs the best they 
could under the watchful eye of two press associations that 
were established with the cooperation of the government and 
the press to manage or control the press during the national 
war crisis. The first was the Newspaper League, which was 
created by representatives of major, regional, and local 
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newspapers on May 28, 1941. Its stated objective was to 
serve "as a self-governing control group of the newspaper 
business." Its goals were "to plan the progress and 
development of the industry, and thereby to fulfill its 
. . TQ . ... 
stated mission."-^ While this implied a fairly broad degree 
of self-regulation, the fact was that the Newspaper League's 
main purpose was to serve as the state's primary agent to 
control expression, reform newspaper editing and management, 
and assist in newsprint rationing. 
Five months later, in February 1942, the Newspaper 
League was converted to a more powerful association. The 
new Newspaper Association, whose membership was appointed by 
the government, was also invested by the government with 
sweeping powers. It had sole authority to control 
management, content, consolidations, cooperative sales, and 
distribution of newsprint and other raw materials. It could 
also legally seize issues of publications that it judged to 
be critical of the government or its press regulations.40 
Although the Newspaper Association had some of the outward 
trappings of self-regulation, there was no doubt whatsoever 
that its purpose was to insure that the official position 
vis-a-vis the press was enforced. Not surprisingly, in view 
of Japanese tradition and the authoritarian control being 
exercised by the government, no formal association or group 
of any kind was formed during this period to fight for 
freedom of expression. 
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As a result of these repressive regulations, the 
Japanese press lost all its freedom during wartime and, 
while it remained in private hands, its policies and content 
were completely subjugated by the government. 
Given the absolute authority of the Newspaper 
Association and the absence of opposition, it was more to 
control its own government and military officials that the 
cabinet also implemented policies severely restricting who 
could talk to journalists. Most information that the press 
could obtain was provided by three main sources: For 
government announcements, news was mostly to come through 
the Cabinet Information Bureau; for war news, only the High 
Command had permission to speak; and for foreign and local 
domestic news, the United News Agency had total control. 
Although it is widely understood that truth is the 
first casualty in war, regardless of country, the Japanese 
press appears to have been at least as great victim of 
government controls as was its counterpart in Nazi Germany. 
Perhaps more so, because the concepts of democracy and 
freedom of expression simply had never gained a foothold in 
Japan before 1945. No such thing could even be contemplated 
by the feudal leaders. Even the Meiji Restoration in 1868 
saw little movement by the government toward freedom. On 
the contrary, the government controlled the press by means 
of both legal and extra-legal censorship. As a result, when 
the expansionist government of the 1930s implemented a 
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series of restrictions on the press, there was no sense of 
outrage that comes from a well-established tradition or 
heritage. In a sense, the Japanese press had always 
suffered from a nightmare of a "reign of terror." On the 
other hand, the press had often "voluntarily" cooperated 
with the government in order to insure that newspapers 
prospered. 
In this study, however, the focus will not be on 
government controls per se. but on how they and other 
factors may have affected the content of the press over four 
specific events from December 1937 to August 1945. Three 
nation-wide newspapers ("majors") were chosen: Asahi 
Shinbun. Yomiuri Shinbun (Yomiuri-Hochi Shinbun from August 
1942), and Mainichi Shinbun. The main focuses are: 
emotional techniques employed in the stories; slant of the 
stories and headlines; the number and variety of information 
sources; overall attitudes toward the enemy and the Axis; 
the number of strong negative words or statements; overall 
propaganda emphases. 
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IV. PROPAGANDA AND PRESS CONTROLS, 1914-1945 
After World War I, the role of propaganda in 
psychological warfare drew much attention from scholars and 
politicians. A general belief in the great persuasive power 
of mass communication emerged, and the media were considered 
as an effective, even sinister, means to shape and sway 
public opinion. 
Harold Lasswell defined propaganda, in 1927, as 
follows: "The control of opinion by significant symbols, or 
to speak more concretely and less accurately, by stories, 
rumors, reports, pictures and other forms of social 
communication."1 Also, he wrote: "A newer and subtler 
instrument must weld thousands and even millions of human 
beings into one amalgamated mass of hate and will and 
hope....The name of this new hammer and anvil of social 
solidarities is propaganda."2 Thus, propaganda was 
identified as a powerful weapon to shape, modify, or 
influence public opinion and to lead human actions desired 
by the communicator. 
Dozens of other definitions of propaganda have been 
offered, but not all need to be repeated in order to get the 
main points. For our purposes, two of them will suffice. 
The first is from the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 
which, in 1937, defined propaganda as "expression of opinion 
or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to 
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influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups 
to predetermined ends."3 Also, during this period of 
international tension, Frederic Bartlett formulated his 
definition of propaganda as being "an attempt to influence 
opinion and conduct—especially social opinion and conduct— 
in such a manner that the persons who adopt the opinions and 
behavior indicated do so without themselves making any 
definite search for reasons."4 
In addition to these definitions, some notations of the 
intent or purpose of propaganda have been pointed out. For 
example, Kimball Young considered propaganda as "the more or 
less deliberately planned and systematic use of symbols, 
chiefly through suggestion and related psychological 
techniques, with a view first to alerting and controlling 
opinions, ideas, and values, and ultimately to changing 
overt actions along predetermined lines....The essential 
psychological element in propaganda is suggestion."5 
Leonard Doob, in 1935, differentiated between intentional 
and unintentional propaganda as follows: "Intentional 
propaganda is a systematic attempt by an interested 
individual (or individuals) to control the attitudes of 
groups of individuals through the use of suggestion and, and 
consequently, to control their actions; unintentional 
propaganda is the control of the attitudes, and 
consequently, the actions of groups of individuals through 
the use of suggestion."6 
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Such functions of propaganda, intentional or 
unintentional, may be strengthened by the use of emotional 
stimuli. For Francis Wilson, propaganda is "a body of 
systematic psychological techniques for acquiring control 
over opinions and the actions of its objects," including two 
sides of effects: Positively, it is "a system of appeals to 
the emotional responses which will favor a supported 
policy"; negatively, it "seeks action or seeks to restrain 
, 7 
action by using appeals to emotional slants." Edgar 
Henderson stated, in his definition, that "Propaganda is any 
anti-rational process consisting of pressure-techniques 
deliberately used to induce the propagandee to commit 
himself before he can think the matter over freely, to such 
attitudes, opinions, or acts as the propagandist desires of 
him."8 
Such emotional appeals are commonly used by 
propagandists effectively to influence or manipulate the 
public's mind. Erwin Fellows characterized those techniques 
as "emotional" and "rational." The former refers to an 
appeal to basic motives or drives, while "rational" 
indicates "the use of recognized logical principles and (in 
most contexts) the use of scientific evidence."9 
Typical of such emotional techniques is the "fear- 
approach." By the use of fearful stimuli in verbal and 
visual communications, the communicator may arouse fear in 
the public's mind, which becomes a main drive to motivate 
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them for the desired attitudes, opinions, or actions. 
Michael Balfour mentioned that such stimuli can be effective 
to mobilize people because they are gripped by fear for 
themselves, their families, and their possessions, 
especially in wartime.10 However, Harold Hays questioned 
the effectiveness of the "fear-approach," claiming that "the 
greater the degree of fear-arousal in a message, the less is 
its effectiveness as a modifying agent," because such a 
message is likely to be perceived as less credible by the 
audience.11 
With regard to government's control over the media in 
wartime, previous studies have shown that there are three 
main strategies: (1) to establish a centralized "press 
intelligence" organization within the government, which 
supervises the media activities; (2) to introduce official 
or voluntary censorship; and (3) to choke the channels of 
communication with government sponsored or approved 
materials, leaving little chance for rumor or allegedly 
disloyal reports. This latter strategy includes the 
restriction of the accessibility of the media to sources of 
information, which might indicate how tightly the government 
controls the media. For example, Donald Shaw and Stephen 
Brauer's study of the relationship between government and 
press reports shows that there is a correlation between 
increasing stress on the government and society and 
increasing restraints on the press. That is, the more the 
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government and society face the stress in a crisis 
situation, the more restraints the press experiences.12 
This result is consistent with the finding of a study by 
John Stevens that reports that the legal and extra-legal 
controls over the news-gathering activities of the American 
press during World War I paralleled the American fortunes of 
war. Thus, the gloomier the situations the nation 
experienced, the stronger the controls over the press.13 
Dick Fitzpatrick suggested, in his study of the volume 
of U.S. government press releases, that the number of press 
releases issued in 1945 increased by 11% compared to that of 
1937, dropping by 15% in 1947. Also, the 1945 total annual 
appropriations of all government agencies for press releases 
increased sixfold over those of 1937.14 Although the study 
does not provide statistics during the period from 1938 to 
1944, these increased numbers of press releases illustrate 
how the U.S. government tried to control the content and 
possibly also access to government by the American media in 
the crisis situation. 
The capacity of mass communication to reach the 
widespread masses facilitates the effects of propaganda 
messages. Such effects are likely to occur especially in 
wartime, because war is the most serious case of national 
crisis. Citizens must be inspired to maximize their love of 
the home land, their hatred of the enemy, and their 
commitment to the war effort to insure victory. During 
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World War I and, to a lesser extent, World War II, 
propaganda became the principal means for motivating them to 
do so. 
The concepts and techniques of propaganda differ 
according to political and economic systems. For example, 
propaganda carried by democratic countries during World War 
II was much different from that of totalitarian countries. 
Eyvind Bratt differentiated between the characteristics of 
propaganda and the role of the press during the war in terms 
of democratic and totalitarian systems.15 In the former, 
the press was treated as a separate political entity that 
stood on its own feet and was expected to initiate political 
programs by itself. The government, making due allowance 
for conflicting interests within the society, would rather 
urge the press to engage in voluntary censorship than impose 
official restrictions. During World War II, generally, the 
U.S. press was willing to cooperate with the government by 
not revealing information that might benefit the enemy, such 
as troop movements. In this environment, propaganda was 
conducted under the official and unofficial guidelines set 
by the government and the press itself. 
On the other hand, in totalitarian countries, the press 
was expected to give the government its most loyal and 
efficient support in shaping public opinion. Therefore, the 
government was able to handle the news as it saw fit. 
Violations of official standards and instructions were 
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strictly punished by suspension, imprisonment, or fines. As 
a result, the press was always associated with the 
government's propaganda operations and became an official 
instrument for propagation. According to Bratt, this was a 
characteristic of the propaganda machine of Germany, Italy, 
and Japan during the war. 
The following sections will discuss the characteristics 
of propaganda employed in democratic and totalitarian 
systems during World War II. 
War Propaganda of the Allies: U.S. and Great Britain 
Generally, the main strategy of the Allies during World 
War II was to attempt to convey a true impression of their 
basic policy intentions, with only a minimum reliance on the 
opposite technique of resorting to the so-called big-lie.16 
Social historian Daniel Lerner's studies of Allied war-time 
propaganda led him to conclude that it "faithfully reflected 
the policy intentions of its political leadership." As a 
result, he wrote, "it can appropriately be designated, 
despite frequent inaccuracies and occasional untruths, as a 
strategy of truth."17 
The propaganda employed by the United States during the 
war was mainly based on the belief that fascism was a menace 
to world peace and had to be destroyed completely. This 
belief led to an approach based on the concepts of 
credibility and truthfulness, which were thought to be 
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essential in determining persuasiveness and credence of 
reports. Thus, the American government, while imposing 
censorship restrictions on the press and causing it other 
forms of inconvenience, never deliberately imposed any kind 
of restraints that systematically prevented the truth from 
being told. Nor did it purposefully plant stories and 
resort to big-lie tactics with the press. 
On the other hand, some critics have held that United 
States propaganda was not always based on facts or truths 
during World War II. For example, Frederick Irion has 
pointed out that the government, through its Office of War 
Information (OWI), tended to use facts "to substantiate 
opinions arrived at by some method not involving facts." 
Irion concluded that if the OWI "had relied either on 
factual materials on which the people could have based their 
opinions or on interpretative data, the informational policy 
of the government would have been a failure."4- Bruce Smith 
argues that the goals of war information programs employed 
by the U.S. government from 1941 to 1945 were to stimulate 
the will to win among the home population, to persuade 
neutral countries to support the Allied position, and to 
demoralize the enemy.19 
Therefore, in terms of the home front, the main tactic 
of propaganda was to stimulate the people's desire to be 
strong, to feel morally justified, and to feel intelligent. 
The logic behind this is as follows: "If the enemy....is 
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telling our public fifty times a week that his armies are 
stronger than our own, and if we do not make adequate reply, 
we may stand a good chance of being beaten, even though our 
p o 
armies are really the stronger. 
With regard to military censorship, two main objectives 
have been, historically, accepted by military officials in 
democracies: (1) to insure the prompt release to the public 
of the maximum information available; and (2) to prevent the 
disclosure of information which would assist the enemy.21 
During World War II, however, an American emphasis on 
increasing soldiers' morale and support from the home front 
was added to these objectives. As Cedric Larson wrote in 
1941, "Our military authorities know that a well-equipped 
'arsenal of ideas' with which to supply weapons of 
psychological warfare is as important as an adequate force 
p p 
of dive bombers and tanks...." 
These U.S. propaganda techniques and controls were most 
associated with the operation of the Office of War 
Information, a bureau that was in charge of official 
propaganda programs. The OWI conducted more than fifty 
campaigns during the war, for such things as food 
restrictions, fat salvage, victory gardens, prevention of 
forest fires, recruitment for the armed forces, and 
promotion of the absolute war effort. The foreign 
propaganda programs were conducted by the OWI's overseas 
branch, the Foreign Information Service, mainly through the 
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radio transmissions over "The Voice of America."23 Thus, 
the U.S. propaganda machine was well-organized through 
cooperation among the government, military, and the media. 
As Raymond Nixon anticipated before the war: "Any new 
controls over the public opinion in the next war....will be 
super-imposed upon the most drastic censorship that the last 
war [World War I] produced and upon the most efficient 
public relations program that the skilled publicity men in 
the Army can devise."24 
Likewise, propaganda programs and censorship system 
were well-managed in Great Britain. Media activities were 
overseen by the News Department of the Foreign Office, whose 
main function was not only to supply news but also to 
"educate the different organs of publicity along the lines 
of the foreign policy pursued by the government."25 Since 
the government especially focused on the potential of radio 
broadcasting as a propaganda instrument, British radio 
coverage became "a constant flow of reports from the 
government department's tantamount to 'gentle propaganda' in 
favor of things as they are."26 
Also, the government strengthened the Defense of the 
Realm Act that had been first issued during World War I. 
Censorship under this law was supposed to suppress only 
factual data that might benefit the enemy, but it also 
granted legal power to curtail freedom of the press if an 
extreme expression against the government were found in the 
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media coverage. According to Eyvind Bratt, British 
censorship was based on a closer relationship between the 
media and the government than that of the United States.27 
Under these conditions, Allied propaganda was spread 
over the world in a generally successful attempt to persuade 
both allies and neutrals of the justice of their cause and 
the inevitability of victory. These efforts were 
accompanied by concerted attempts to demoralize the enemy. 
Though it greatly varied in content and forms of 
communications, some examples of Allied propaganda 
techniques are mentioned here. 
Of particular interest to this thesis is the propaganda 
used to denigrate the enemy's strength, moral character, and 
aims. For example, the United States and British press paid 
great attention during World War II to alleged Japanese 
atrocities in occupied territories. The Bataan "death 
march" was described in detail, as was the forced use of 
prisoners of war to build the Burma railway. Other stories 
that were covered in detail involved overcrowding and 
starvation in POW camps, the beheading of prisoners, mass 
executions, and rape of civilian women by Japanese soldiers. 
While most of these stories were based on fact, Vernon 
McKenzie claims that at least some of them were made up by 
no 
reporters. ° Atrocity stories generally were common to both 
the Allied and Axis sides during World War II, but, as 
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Phillip Knightly observed, "neither side reported its own 
atrocities. "29 
Allied propaganda about the Japanese people was 
occasionally even more sweeping and ill-founded. Some 
British and American propagandists encouraged the view that 
the Japanese were "'apes in uniform,' lacking sufficient 
intelligence to master mechanized warfare, unable to learn 
to pilot planes because they had been strapped to their 
mother's backs as babies and had thus lost their sense of 
balance."30 Racially, the Japanese were described as 
"yellow" or even "yellow monkeys" by some American 
newspapers and magazines. It was not just because of 
headline constraints that the word "Japanese" was inevitably 
shortened to "Jap." 
Since one of the primary purposes of this thesis is to 
examine treatment by the Japanese press of their enemies 
during wartime, suffice it to say for now that the Japanese 
counterpart to "yellow monkey" was "brutal demon" to 
characterize Americans. As a matter of fact, this kind of 
negative wording was less frequently used by the Allies than 
it was by the Axis powers, of which Germany was by far the 
most aggressive in using "black propaganda" (attacks aimed 
at portraying the enemy in as bad a light as possible). 
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Axis Propaganda: Germany and Japan under Totalitarianism 
Immediately after the outbreak of World War II in 
Europe in September 1939, the Institute for Propaganda 
Analysis stated that "Germany is beating the Allies badly in 
'the war of words.' So marked, in fact, has been the 
alleged superiority of the German propaganda machine that 
London newspapers....were bitterly denouncing their Ministry 
of Information."31 
This superiority of German propaganda to that of the 
Allies at the beginning of the war can be attributed to 
three factors. First was Germany's past experience in 
propaganda, not only during World War I, but also during the 
Nazi rise to power. These efforts were aided immensely by a 
series of early victories on the battlefields of Europe. 
Second was the absolute control that the government had 
established over German radio and newspapers from 1933 
onwards. Not only did the Nazis take over the press, but 
they also controlled all other forms of communication. As 
Michael McGuire wrote: "In the Third Reich journalism, 
literature, drama, painting, sculpture, architecture, and 
music all were regulated for use as assertive media to put 
the Nazi's message in the public eye and mind."32 Third was 
the skill of both Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels, who 
served as head of the Ministry of Propaganda and 
Enlightenment. Both men were skilled and experienced 
professionals when it came to the "war of words." 
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According to Daniel Lerner, Nazi propaganda during 
World War II was set in a context of overall falsehood, 
because while the Germans actually "intended to rule Europe, 
they pretended that they wanted only to save Europe from the 
Bolshevik menace."33 Based on this "false" context, the 
Nazis conducted propaganda campaigns which were systematic 
misrepresentations of their overall policy—a strategy of 
the big-lie. The totalitarian (or dictatorship) system of 
Germany facilitated such campaigns to persuade Europe to 
accept a hegemony ruled by the "superior German race." 
Although Hitler set the tone with his emotional 
speeches, it was Goebbels who was primarily responsible for 
Germany's propaganda successes. Described as a "fiery and 
persuasive orator" who was ignorant of foreign affairs, 
Goebbels dedicated his efforts toward advancing the cause of 
his Fuehrer through every means possible.34 He was 
convinced that all propaganda media must operate according 
to strictly defined ideological guidelines, and his Ministry 
possessed the power and the will to exercise almost total 
control over all media outlets in Nazi Germany and occupied 
territories. 
Goebbels also tailored his appeals to the uneducated 
masses, as opposed to intellectuals, whom he regarded as 
hopeless. The second key to his success was based on his 
conviction that propaganda should appeal to the emotions, 
not to reason, and that it should concentrate on repeating a 
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few simple themes.35 More than any single person during 
World War II, it was Goebbels who was able to divorce 
himself from truth in favor of hammering against the enemy 
with "black" or "gray" propaganda.36 
In summary, German propaganda was effective, not only 
on the home front, but also in other areas of Europe, for 
five reasons. First, the nation's totalitarian system under 
Hitler allowed total control of the state; second, Hitler's 
manipulation of images and persuasive techniques; third, a 
well-organized propaganda institution and its strict 
controls over the media; fourth, Goebbels' skill in 
propaganda techniques and his authority over the Ministry of 
Propaganda and Enlightenment; and, finally, the suppression 
of ideological opponents in Germany by means of the death 
penalty and the concentration camp system. Such manners 
were imitated by the other members of the Axis, but both 
Italy and Japan "lacked the skill which at times has been 
. . 7 
exhibited by the Germans." 
Because the main characteristics of Japanese propaganda 
for the home front during World War II were described in 
Chapter 3, only a few more studies useful for the 
understanding of the other Japanese wartime media and 
foreign propaganda are added here. 
As in the case of the press, Japanese state censorship 
shaped radio and film-making. Most of the films and radio 
programs created during the war had the usual wartime 
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propaganda themes, such as "national polity," the justice of 
Japan's "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," and 
the "spiritual virtue and strong morale" of the Japanese. 
The Home Ministry prescribed that films have "healthy 
entertainment value, with themes showing persons ready to 
serve patriotically."38 Anthony Rhodes wrote: "No doubt all 
this reinforced patriotic ideals and maintained the image of 
the Allies as nefarious villains."39 However, it also has 
been pointed out that the techniques used in audio-visual 
communications of domestic propaganda were not as effective 
as those of Germany. For example, William Murphy concluded 
that Japan failed to exploit the full potential of 
documentary films as a propaganda weapon, stating that 
"Japan's wartime films lacked real information and made 
little effort toward a documentary style. Not photographing 
the attack on Pearl Harbor in greater detail was a singular 
tactical error."40 
The reform of the education system was another means 
for controlling the public's view of the world. Military 
ideals were specifically emphasized in the lectures of every 
school. Books on the divinity of the emperor and the duty 
of the citizen to devote everything became compulsory 
reading, and history books were revised and mixed with a 
course on ethics and morals. The fields of navigation, 
aviation, horsemanship, and mechanics took the most 
priority.41 
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With regard to Japanese foreign propaganda, short-wave 
radio broadcasting played the main role. In each of the 
Eastern Asian occupied areas, Japanese forces installed a 
short-wave broadcasting system, embracing the entire "Co- 
Prosperity Sphere." It provided "uninterrupted flow of 
propaganda about Japan's plans for Asian welfare, together 
with denigration of the 'Anglo-Saxon tyrants'."42 For the 
Allied soldiers, there was a 15-minute long daily radio 
program, hosted by a Japanese American woman called "Tokyo 
Rose," who tried to be as sentimental as she could about the 
U.S. to exacerbate the G.I.s' natural disposition to become 
homesick, while serving thousands of miles away from their 
loved ones. Also, a prisoner-of-war broadcast was conducted 
to publicize Japan's humanity in treating prisoners of the 
POW camps.43 
Other forms of communication, such as posters, 
leaflets, lectures on native local leaders, and local 
newspapers and radio stations, were used in the occupied 
areas in the same manner. Charles Lomas' empirical research 
within the occupied Asian areas from 1944 to 1945 describes 
some characteristics of the Japanese propaganda.44 His 
report shows that emotional stories markedly increased as 
Japan lost power. He also found that the basic thrust of 
Japanese propaganda changed during that one-year period. 
Also, two main themes emerged during this time: (1) Local 
communities throughout Asia were happily building a new 
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economic and social structure under Japanese guidance; and 
(2) local leaders were enthusiastically cooperating with 
Japan to bring about the victory of "all Asians." 
Overall, Japanese propagandists proved to be less 
skillful than their German counterparts. Lomas identified 
three shortcomings that adversely influenced Japanese 
efforts as propagandists. First, the Japanese did not make 
effective use of all of the available means of persuasion, 
particularly radio and films. Second, they were never able 
to square their version of the "Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere" with a political reality that had become 
evident even before Pearl Harbor. Finally, at least some 
Japanese citizens discredited the propagandists because they 
knew some of the "facts" reported were untrue, especially at 
the final stages of the war. In other words, a long 
tradition of family honor made it possible for some Japanese 
to hold propagandists in disgrace because they were known to 
be circulating untruths. J 
Another scholar, Anthony Rhodes, who also concluded 
that Japanese propaganda efforts had not worked effectively 
enough, identified his own three reasons for this. First, 
the structure of fascism in Japan was not as organized or 
thorough as it had been in Europe, making it much more 
difficult for Tokyo to control the media as completely as 
Berlin had done. Second, an underlying disagreement between 
government leaders and military headquarters about war aims 
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caused conflicting directives to be issued which, in turn, 
made it difficult for propagandists to hammer on a few 
simple themes. Finally, during the last stages of the war, 
Japan could not counter the reality of pending defeat and 
the blitz of Allied propaganda that was being spread over 
the occupied areas and the home front.46 
Given this background of the rise of fascism and 
militarism in Europe and the Far East, it is valuable to 
attempt to understand to what degree there was uniformity 
and to what degree Germany and Japan operated independently 
of each other in their techniques of propaganda and press 
controls. Did they learn from one another in such areas as 
newspaper reporting, media control and government 
censorship? Or did each evolve according to its own 
traditions and cultures? Much is already known about Nazi 
Germany, but Japan's emergence as an aggressive force still 
poses questions. This study seeks to better understand the 
role of the Japanese newspaper press during wartime and to 
compare it to an earlier event that, while aggressive in 
nature, did not portend a global conflict. 
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V. HYPOTHESES 
Considering the discussions and findings of previous 
studies, this research focuses on how three major Tokyo 
newspapers covered four events over an eight year period, 
from December 1937 to August 1945. The main assumption is 
that the more unfavorable the military situation becomes, 
the more restrictions the press will experience, and, 
therefore, the more biased and emotional the news coverage 
will become. From this point of view, the following five 
general hypotheses were set: 
(1) During the initial period of the war, when Japan's 
invasion of China resulted in a series of military 
victories, there was a general confidence about the outcome. 
Therefore, there will be relatively few restrictions on the 
press; that is, stories will tend to be more factual and 
unbiased, with many sources from many locations. 
(2) During the second period of the war, after Japan 
declared war against the United States and the other Allied 
powers, there was less confidence about the outcome among 
the Japanese public because of the superior military power 
of the new enemies. In this situation, there will be more 
press restrictions, resulting in the use of fewer sources 
and fewer foreign wire service stories. At the same time, 
the tone of stories related to the war will become more 
emotional and biased. 
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(3) During the third period of the war, Japan experienced 
its first major military defeat, but the outcome of the war 
was not yet clear. In this situation, there will be a 
greater degree of press restrictions than ever before, 
resulting in the use of fewer sources and fewer foreign wire 
service stories. At the same time, the tone of war stories 
will become even more emotional and biased. 
(4) During the final days of the war, when Japan experienced 
heavy military and civilian losses because of air raids on 
the homeland, the Japanese public became painfully aware 
that they were losing the war. In this desperate situation, 
government press restrictions will be the most severe and 
the tone of news stories will become the most emotional and 
biased of any of the four periods. 
(5) While the three major newspapers had traditionally 
presented different points of view in important ways, these 
distinctions will become less pronounced as Japan becomes 
progressively more embroiled in military combat. Thus, by 
the fall of Nanking in December 1937, official restrictions 
on the Japanese press will be so well-established that news 
coverage by these three newspapers will be uniform in 
content and uncritical in tone through all four periods. 
These general hypotheses are tested by means of the 
following seven specific subhypotheses: 
(A) "Emotional" stories will increase in the Japanese press 
coverage from 1937 to 1945; that is, "emotional" stories 
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will be least frequently found in 1937, increase over time, 
and be most frequently found in 1945. 
(B) "Slanted" stories and headlines will follow the same 
pattern as "emotional" stories; that is, they will least 
frequently appear in 1937, increase over time, and most 
frequently appear in 1945. 
(C) The total number of sources cited in news stories will 
follow a reverse pattern: that is, it will be the highest in 
1937, decrease over time, and be the lowest in 1945. 
(D) The variety of sources will also decrease from 1937 to 
1945. Specifically, the number of Japanese government and 
military sources will increase through the four periods, 
while foreign and "other Japanese" sources will decrease. 
(E) The specificity of sources will decrease from 1937 to 
1945. That is, the number of sources attributed by name and 
specific title will decrease through the four periods, while 
the number of sources without name, but identified only by 
general title will increase. 
(F) Attitudes expressed toward the enemy (the United States, 
Great Britain, Russia, and China) will become increasingly 
critical from 1937 to 1945. At the same time, press 
statements about the Axis (Germany, Italy, and Japan) will 
remain essentially positive throughout the period. 
(G) The number of negative words or statements employed 
against the enemy will increase from 1937 to 1945. 
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VI. METHODOLOGY 
The primary research method employed in this study is 
content analysis. In addition, qualitative assessments have 
been employed in an attempt to address some of the 
criticisms of a strictly numerical approach. As will be 
seen, each method has its strengths and weaknesses. By 
bringing both to bear on the topic, it is hoped that the 
overall effect will be greater understanding of the topic 
and its conclusions. 
Content analysis, in qualitative terms, has been around 
for centuries. But the application of statistical methods 
to the study of content is a relatively recent research 
development. One of the pioneers in the field, Bernard 
Berelson, defined content analysis in 1952 as "a research 
technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative 
description of the manifest content of communication."1 
Since "the classification into a single set of categories 
taken at different times provides a concise description of 
content trends, in terms of relative frequencies of 
occurrence," content analysis can be useful in providing 
data "which can be correlated with corresponding changes on 
the part of the communicator or the audience."2 
Another scholar, Guido Stempel III, has defined in more 
detail what is meant by the words objective, systematic and 
quantitative. To be "objective," he writes, the categories 
82 
must be defined so precisely that "different researchers can 
apply them to the same content and get the same result." 
The term "systematic" denotes that a set of procedures is 
applied in the same way to all the content analyzed, that 
categories are set up so that all relevant content is 
analyzed, and that the analyses are designed to secure data 
relevant to a research question. "Quantitative" means "the 
recording of numerical values or the frequencies with which 
the various types of content occur." 
Although quantitative analysis is one of the most 
valuable methods to describe trends in mass communication 
content, some scholars have been disturbed by what they see 
as a tendency for researchers to rely on "mere frequencies" 
while overlooking the "real meaning" that is implicit in the 
content.4 While the use of content analysis is now firmly 
established as a major research tool, there are still many 
scholars who would argue that far too much significance is 
placed on numerical values that are, in the final analysis, 
based on qualitative (subjective) judgments that are 
required of the researcher in the data gathering phase of 
the research. 
On the other hand, Berelson argues that the qualitative 
scholar is, consciously or otherwise, employing quantitative 
techniques in his or her research. He has identified seven 
arguments to underline his point: First, much qualitative 
analysis is quasi-quantitative; second, qualitative analysis 
83 
is often based upon the presence or absence of particular 
content; third, it is done on a small or incomplete sample; 
fourth, it usually contains a higher ratio of non-content 
statements than quantitative analysis; fifth, it is 
relatively less concerned with the content as such than with 
content as a "reflection" of "deeper" phenomena; sixth, it 
employs less formalized categorization than quantitative 
analysis; and, finally, it utilizes more complex themes than 
quantitative analysis.5 
Considering these discussions, this study used both 
techniques. Quantitative analysis will provide some 
empirical data to describe content trends of the three 
Japanese newspapers from 1937 to 1945. Qualitative 
assessments will help to analyze a "reflection of deeper 
phenomena," such as story themes, variety (name and title) 
of information sources used, and specific wording. This 
application of the two methods should be useful to an 
understanding of the characteristics of Japanese propaganda 
before and during World War II. 
Sample and Sampling Method 
Three nation-wide, Japanese-language daily newspapers, 
Asahi Shinbun. Yomiuri Shinbun, and Mainichi Shinbun. were 
selected as the subject of this content analysis. During 
the Pacific War, only these papers were authorized by the 
government as nation-wide newspapers, which were called 
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''majors." These newspapers were the most influential in 
shaping public opinion, just as they are prominent 
newspapers today. Because the main objective of this study 
was to describe Japanese propaganda techniques employed by 
domestic newspapers for the Japanese people, the three 
papers were most appropriate to be examined. 
The study sample included all stories appearing on the 
front page of the three newspapers. Since it was obviously 
not possible to examine the front-page content of each paper 
for every day over an eight-year period, it was decided to 
concentrate on coverage of events that represented different 
stages in the development of the war and, thus, different 
problems for the propagandists who were controlling the 
print media in Japan. 
The first was the fall of Nanking (China) on December 
12, 1937, when Japanese troops routed the Chinese armies and 
effectively established control over a large portion of the 
nation that had been an enemy for six years.6 The second 
event was the air attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 
1941, when Japan scored an equally decisive victory over the 
United States navy. 
These two military successes were matched by two 
decisive defeats. The first was the Battle of Midway on 
June 4, 1942, when the Japanese navy suffered devastating 
losses. This is considered by most historians as the 
beginning of the end for Tokyo. The final event was Japan's 
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unconditional surrender on August 14, 1945, when the Pacific 
War was officially ended on board the USS Missouri. 
For convenience, these events may be identified in 
tables as the years when they occurred: 1937 for the fall of 
Nanking, 1941 for the Pearl Harbor attack, 1942 for the 
Battle of Midway, and 1945 for Japan's surrender. It should 
be also noted that, in Tokyo time, these four events each 
occurred one day later than in U.S. time. Since it would 
seem alien to most readers of this thesis to be reminded 
that Pearl Harbor occurred on December 8, western dates were 
used in the text, though Tokyo time was used in selecting 
the issues of newspapers for study. 
Because of the number of stories and the time required 
to analyze these reports from all three newspapers, the 
study of each of the four events was narrowed to five dates- 
-two before and three after each event. It was also decided 
that a wider range of issues and impressions could be 
captured if the dates selected were not consecutive. In 
other words, it was felt that reports a day apart were not 
as likely to reflect shifts in attitudes as would coverage 
over a wider time frame. Thus, the dates were chosen over a 
9-day period. In the cases of Nanking, Pearl Harbor and 
Midway, the dates were: three days before the event, the day 
before the event, the day after the event, three days after 
the event and five days after the event. 
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Thus, using Tokyo time, the issues selected appeared 
on: 
Fall of Nanking: December 10, 12, 14, 16 and 18, 1937. 
Pearl Harbor: December 5, 7, 9, 11 and 13, 1941. 
Battle of Midway: June 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, 1942. 
Only in the case of Japan's unconditional surrender was the 
selection different. Since this study did not focus on the 
coverage "after" the war, five days before the surrender 
were chosen: August 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14, 1945. As a result, 
the total number of front pages examined was 60: 20 from 
each of the three newspapers, or 15 for each of the four 
events (see Table 1). 
The unit of analysis was every story on the front page 
of each issue. The average number of stories on the front 
page of each issue was 10.7 (11.3 for Asahi Shinbun. 9.9 for 
Yomiuri Shinbun. 11.0 for Mainichi Shinbun)♦ The total 
number of stories was 644 (226 for Asahi. 198 for Yomiuri. 
and 220 for Mainichi. see Table 2). 
Table 1. Number of front pages selected from three papers 
according to four events from 1937 to 1945 
Newspaper 1937 
Year 
1941 1942 1945 Total 
Asahi 5 5 5 5 20 
Yomiuri 5 5 5 5 20 
Mainichi 5 5 5 5 20 
Total 15 15 15 15 60 
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Table 2. Total and average number of stories selected from 
three newspapers 
Newspaper 1937 
Year 
1941 1942 1945 Total Average3 
Asahi 63 59 46 58 226 11.3 
Yomiuri 47 58 38 55 198 9.9 
Mainichi 43 58 43 76 220 11.0 
Total 153 175 127 189 644 10.7 
a
 The average number of stories on the front page of each 
issue. 
Theoretical and Operational Definitions of Variables 
Kind of Story 
The four categories into which the stories were 
differentiated were as follows: domestic and war-related; 
domestic and not related to war; foreign and war-related; 
and foreign and not related to war. The terms "domestic” 
and "foreign" refer to the location of the event reported in 
the story. 
For example, air raids on any cities in Japan were 
considered as "domestic/war-related." The domestic, 
political and economic news that was not specifically 
related to the war was categorized into the group of 
"domestic/non-war." Any stories that reported war-related 
events which occurred outside Japan's territory (the 
occupied areas were not considered as Japan's territory) 
were categorized as "foreign/war-related." All information 
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about foreign countries that was not related to the war was 
"foreign/non-war." 
Writer of Story 
This variable shows who wrote the story (or provided 
the main content of the story). It included the following 
seven categories: staff of the newspaper; Japanese wire 
service (the United News Agency, called "Ddmei"); the United 
Press; the Associated Press; Reuters (Britain); Agence 
Francaise; and other or uncertain authorship. 
After 1936, all foreign news entering Japan was 
transmitted through the United News Agency, a centralized 
official news agency. In this sense, the Japanese press had 
no way to get information carried by other wire services 
from 1936 to 1945. However, the United News Agency usually 
obtained foreign information by monitoring other wire 
services, and it indicated which wire service was monitored, 
as "According to Reuters...." Because, in such cases, it 
can be assumed that the main content of the story was 
written by other wire services, the indicated wire service 
was considered as the "writer of the story." If there was 
no identification of other wire services, and only the name 
of "Domei" was indicated, the story was considered as a 
"Japanese wire service" story. 
It should be also mentioned that many stories were 
written by staff of the newspapers without by-lines. This 
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is an aspect of Japanese newspaper culture that remains 
today. As distinguished from other countries' press, 
Japanese newspapers generally do not carry by-lines with 
their stories. Therefore, unsigned stories were considered 
to be written by the staff of the papers, except the cases 
in which it was clearly known that the story was written by 
non-staff members. In such cases, the story was categorized 
as "other or uncertain authorship." 
Number of Sources 
This part shows how many sources were cited in the 
story by the writer. First, the total number of sources 
used was counted, then divided into three variables: the 
number of sources identified by name and specific title; the 
number of sources not identified by name, but by a specific 
title; the number of sources not identified by name and a 
specific title, but only by a general title. 
Since one of the main strategies of government controls 
over the press is to restrict the information sources 
available to the press, it can be assumed that the number 
and variety of sources cited in the stories illustrate how 
tightly the government controlled the press performance in 
wartime; that is, the fewer sources the stories carried, the 
more tightly the government controlled the press. Likewise, 
if the number of sources only with a general title 
increased, it can be assumed that the press had more 
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difficulty gaining access to individual specific sources not 
authorized by the government. 
Variety of Sources 
The sources cited in the stories were divided into four 
variables: the Japanese government; the Japanese military, 
such as the High Command, navy, army, or air force; other 
Japanese, such as the Imperial Palace, industry, religion, 
education, etc.; and foreign sources. These variables show 
what kinds of sources were most likely to be used. 
For example, if the Japanese government or military 
sources were most frequently used, the official censorship 
would be more strict. On the other hand, if the number of 
foreign sources increased, it would mean that the newspapers 
were able to manage their information with relatively fewer 
official restraints. 
Overall Category of Storv 
This variable was set to describe how the proportion of 
basic propaganda emphases changed from 1937 to 1945. Twelve 
categories were created based on the eight categories used 
by Charles Lomas' study of Japanese war propaganda in the 
East Asian occupied areas from 1944 to 1945.7 Those 
categories included: (1) war news; (2) strength of Japanese 
material, morale, or morality; (3) Japanese solidarity with 
"The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and its 
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progress; (4) strength of the Axis Powers; (5) domestic news 
(non-war, political and economic issues); (6) foreign news 
(non-war, political and economic issues); (7) weakness or 
wickedness of U.S. material, morale, or morality; (8) 
weakness or wickedness of British material, morale, or 
morality; (9) weakness or wickedness of the enemy 
(collectively); (10) fear stories (atrocities, war crimes, 
etc.)/ (11) miscellaneous (war-related); and (12) 
miscellaneous (not related to the war). 
"War news" was any description of the war situation at 
any battle field, no matter whether it dealt with the 
Japanese military action or not. For example, the story 
about the battle between Germany and Russia was classified 
as "war news," as were the stories about conflicts between 
the U.S. and Japanese army at the South East Asian islands. 
The focus of this category was not on whether the 
report was truthful or not, but on how the war event was 
described. For example, when the report objectively 
described a battle between the Chinese and Japanese 
military, it was categorized as "war news." However, if the 
story emphasized or exaggerated the strength of the Japanese 
through the use of emotional words, it was classified under 
the "strength of the Japanese material, morale, or 
morality." Similarly, a war report was considered as the 
"strength of the Axis powers," when it emphasized the 
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strength of Germany or Italy or their progress rather than 
objectively described the war situation. 
The third category, "Japanese solidarity with 'The 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' and its progress," 
dealt with the stories which focused on the ideological 
theme, the justification of Japan's war effort, and the 
cooperation among the "Asian fellows" under Japanese 
leadership. 
The "domestic news" and "foreign news" were the stories 
that intended to inform the Japanese public of domestic and 
foreign political or economic issue, which were not directly 
related to the war. 
The seventh, eighth, and ninth categories dealt with 
stories about the "weakness or wickedness" of the United 
States, Great Britain, or the enemy (collectively). For 
example, if a story sought to persuade the Japanese public 
to believe that the United States was a "wicked" nation 
which attempted to conquer the world, regardless of its 
"weak" material, morale or morality, and that Japan's 
"justice," therefore, had to be accomplished to "save the 
world," it was considered as critical of the "weakness or 
wickedness of the U.S. material, morale, or morality." 
Likewise, the stories with similar kinds of statements about 
Great Britain were categorized as critical of the "weakness 
or wickedness of the British material, morale, or morality." 
The negative stories about Japan's other enemies, such as 
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Russia, China, Australia, etc., were put into the group of 
"weakness or wickedness of the enemy (collectively)." 
"Fear stories" referred to reports arousing fear of the 
enemy in the Japanese public's mind, whether or not those 
stories had factual bases. Atrocities and war crimes 
committed by the enemy were typical examples of such 
stories. Also, any stories with deceptive or exaggerated 
comments on the "inhumanity" or "cruelty" of the enemy were 
included in this category. 
Finally, the stories that did not fit the categories 
mentioned above were categorized as "miscellaneous," either 
war-related or not related to the war. These included both 
domestic and foreign reports. 
Although many stories contained several propaganda 
emphases, every story was exclusively classified into a 
given category based on its most distinctive emphasis. For 
example, as one of typical techniques in war propaganda, the 
"strength" of the Japanese soldiers was frequently 
emphasized by exaggerating the "weakness" of the enemy. In 
such cases, the story was identified as either the "strength 
of the Japanese" or "weakness or wickedness" of the enemy, 
according to the primary impression indicated. 
Slant of Headline 
Whether the headline (including sub-headlines) carried 
a slant or not was determined according to the following two 
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categories: slanted, including both pro-Japanese and anti- 
enemy; unslanted or neutral. 
Other criteria used in establishing the slant of a 
headline were identical to those described in the next 
variable. 
Slant of Storv 
This variable was to determine whether the overall 
story carried any slant, either toward Japanese military 
strength or domestic and foreign policies or against the 
enemy's military power or policies. In this case, "slant" 
means that the story had some sort of distortion, deception, 
or exaggeration of the information. 
The following five categories were created for this 
variable: slanted toward Japan or the Axis; slanted against 
the enemy; unslanted or neutral about Japan or the Axis; 
unslanted or neutral about the enemy; and cannot tell or 
other. 
Since it was very difficult to verify the truthfulness 
of reports, what the story said was basically considered as 
"factual," except for cases in which the descriptions of 
events were obviously distorted (for example, the Battle of 
the Coral Sea in 1942 was reported as a "great victory" for 
Japan by the Japanese newspapers, though the battle ended in 
a draw). Therefore, the distinction between "slanted" and 
"unslanted or neutral" was mainly made based on the primary 
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impression given by the wording used in the story. That is, 
if the story presented any subjectivity that might cause the 
audience to have mis-perceptions of reality, whether the 
overall content had a factual basis or not, it was 
considered to be "slanted." 
For example, when the story objectively described U.S. 
policy toward Japan, without any intention to disgrace the 
enemy, it was categorized as "unslanted or neutral." On the 
other hand, if the story not only explained U.S. policy 
toward Japan, but also attempted to justify Tokyo's position 
by criticizing the enemy's policy with unreasonable negative 
comments, it was considered "slanted." Likewise, if the 
story objectively or accurately reported a Japanese defeat 
or victory only with reasonable comments, it was considered 
"unslanted or neutral," while "slanted" included stories 
that exaggerated the "strength" of the Japanese or the 
"weakness" of the enemy. 
When the distinction between "slanted" or "unslanted" 
was not clearly determined, the story was classified as 
"cannot tell or other," which also included any stories 
about neutral countries. 
Emotional Technique 
This variable shows to what extent the story would 
emotionally appeal to the Japanese public's mind. The 
following four categories were set based on the different 
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degrees of probable emotional impact: highly rational; 
somewhat rational; somewhat emotional; highly emotional. 
According to the typology of Erwin Fellows, the term 
"emotional" is taken to "indicate an appeal to basic motives 
or drives." On the other hand, "rational" includes "the use 
of recognized logical principles in arriving at conclusions 
and (in most contexts) the use of scientific evidence."8 
However, in this study, "emotional" refers to a story 
designed to arouse or appeal to people's emotional feelings, 
while "rational" was considered as a story designed to 
inform or persuade people by representing the reasonable 
observation or attitude of the reporter. In this sense, a 
"rational" story is not necessarily one that contains 
scientific or verified evidence. 
Number of strong Negative Words or Statements 
The number of strong negative words in each story was 
counted because such words would significantly affect the 
Japanese people's perceptions of and attitudes against the 
enemy. In this case, the negative words used in headlines 
were also included. 
When a specific statement presented a strongly negative 
attitude against the enemy, even though it contained no 
specific negative words, it was counted as one negative 
word. 
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Direction of Attitude 
The last variable dealt with the overall attitudes of 
the stories toward the seven main protagonists that 
comprised the Axis (Germany, Italy, and Japan) and the enemy 
(the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and 
China). 
The direction of attitudes of each story was indicated 
by three categories: "anti-," "pro-," and "neutral." All 
the directions of attitudes toward more than one country 
presented by the story were also determined. For example, 
when a story indicated the anti-attitude against the United 
States and Britain and the pro-attitude toward Japan, it was 
considered to contain three directions: "anti-" for the 
United States and Britain and "pro-" for Japan. 
In addition to the direction of attitude toward the 
individual country, the difference between the attitudes 
toward the "enemy" and toward "the Axis" was also examined 
in this study. 
Coding 
Each story in the sample was coded by the researcher, 
based on the variables mentioned above. A three-page coding 
sheet was created for this content analysis (see Appendix 
B). In advance of the research, two graduate students 
(including the researcher) and one undergraduate student 
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coded ten stories to check the reliability of the coding 
sheet. 
The result of this intercoder reliability check was as 
follows: An 86.4 percent agreement was obtained between 
Coder A (the researcher) and Coder B (the other graduate); 
Between Coder A and Coder C (the undergraduate), the 
agreement was 81.6%; The agreement between Coder B and Coder 
C was 79.2%. Overall, the total percentage of agreement 
Q 
among the three coders came to be 76.4%. 
Data Analysis Technique 
In this study, two main statistical techniques were 
used to analyze the data obtained. First, chi square test 
was used to determine whether the observed differences of 
frequencies among variables were statistically significant. 
Second, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Scheffe 
test was used to determine if the observed differences of 
group means were statistically significant. The mean 
differences of the following three variables among the four 
time periods and among the three newspapers were examined by 
means of this technique: degree of emotions; total number of 
sources; and number of strong negative words or statements. 
For all the hypothesis-testing, .05 significance level 
was used. 
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VII. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
Subhypothesis-Testing 
The data obtained through the coding procedure 
described in the previous chapter show that stories dealing 
with foreign events related to war appeared most freguently 
in the three Japanese newspapers from 1937 to 1945 (Table 
3). Of all 644 stories examined, 379 or 58.9 percent were 
"foreign/war-related." Yomiuri used slightly more 
"foreign/war" stories than the other two papers, while Asahi 
showed the highest rate in the use of "foreign/non-war" 
stories. There was little difference among the other two 
categories, "domestic/war-related" and "domestic/non-war." 
Also, the result of a chi square test indicates that there 
was no significant difference in the kind of stories covered 
by the three papers. This result may reflect the uniformity 
in the coverage of Japanese domestic newspapers from 1937 to 
1945. 
When the relationship between the kind of stories and 
the time variable was considered, however, the proportion of 
the four kinds of stories significantly changed from 1937 to 
1945 (Table 4). "Domestic/war-related" stories dramatically 
increased at the final stage—Japan's surrender in 1945— 
because of the marked increase of air raids on Japan's 
homeland. Since domestic news at this period was dominated 
by information related to the U.S. air raids, "domestic/non- 
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Table 3. Kind of stories covered by three Japanese 
newspapers 
Kind Asahi (%) 
Newspaper 
Yomiuri (%) Mainichi (%) Total (%) 
Domestic/ 
war 
31 13.7 25 12.6 29 13.2 85 13.2 
Domestic/ 
non-war 
31 13.7 29 14.6 30 13.6 90 14.0 
Foreign/ 
war 
127 56.2 122 61.7 130 59.1 379 58.9 
Foreign/ 
non-war 
37 16.4 22 11.1 31 14.1 220 34.2 
Total 226 100.0 198 100.0 220 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 2.811 , p N. S., df = 6. 
Table 4. Kind of stories from 1937 to 1945 
Kind 1937 (%) 1941 
Year 
(%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Domestic/ 
war 
5 3.3 11 6.3 5 3.9 64 33.9 85 13.2 
Domestic/ 
non-war 
14 9.1 24 13.7 28 22.1 24 12.7 90 14.0 
Foreign/ 
war 
115 75.2 121 69.1 84 66.1 59 31.2 379 58.9 
Foreign/ 
non-war 
19 12.4 19 10.9 10 7.9 42 22.2 90 14.0 
Total 153 100.0 175 100.0 127 100.0 188 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 145. 667, P < • 001, df = 9. 
war” stories decreased by 9.4% from 1942 to 1945. Also, 
"foreign/war-related" stories decreased in 1945. On the 
other hand, "foreign/non-war" stories increased from 7.9 % 
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in 1942 to 22.2 % in 1945, probably because Japan's concern 
for its diplomatic negotiations with the Allied countries 
increased after the Potsdam Declaration in July, 1945. 
With regard to the writer of the stories, there were 
also some similarities among the three papers (Table 5). 
Nearly 70% of the stories of all the newspapers were written 
by their own staff. More than 24% of the stories were 
written by the United News Agency (Domei), a centralized 
official news agency. This means that 93.6 % of the stories 
were managed by Japanese writers. Asahi was twice as likely 
to use stories written by foreign wire services (9.8%) than 
the others (4.5% for Mainichi and 4.5% for Yomiuri). The 
trends of Yomiuri and Mainichi regarding the writers of 
stories were almost identical. Overall, the result of a 
Table 5. Number of stories written by various writers 
Writer A 
Newspaper 
(%) Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
Staff 157 69.5 138 69.7 152 69.1 447 69.4 
D5mei 47 20.8 51 25.8 58 26.4 156 24.2 
Other 
wiresa 
22 9.7 9 4.5 10 4.5 41 6.4 
Total 226 100.0 198 100.0 220 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 7.914, p N.S., df = 4. 
a
 "Other wires" includes: United Press, Associated Press, 
Reuters, Agence Francaise, and other/uncertain authorship. 
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chi square test suggests that there was no significant 
difference in the writer of stories among the three papers. 
Of the foreign wire services, Reuters (Great Britain) 
was most frequently used by the Japanese newspapers (5.3% by 
Asahi and 1.5% by Yqmiuri), despite the fact that the wire 
service was owned by the British enemy. Also, four stories 
written by the Associated Press of the United States were 
carried by Asahi (1.8% of the total in the paper). Mainichi 
was more dependent on the Agence Francaise (3.6% of the 
total in the paper), such as Abas (France) and Tass (the 
Soviet Union). This difference was probably caused by the 
various connections with foreign wire services before the 
beginning of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937. 
Table 6 illustrates how the proportion of stories 
written by the various writers changed from 1937 to 1945. 
The result of a chi square test suggests that there was a 
significant change in the writer of stories through the four 
periods. The total percentage of stories written by 
Japanese writers (the newspapers' own staff or Domei) 
continued to be over 90% through the four periods. This 
suggests that the state was constantly able to control 
Japanese press performance from 1937 to 1945. 
The most distinct change occurred in 1942, during the 
Battle of Midway, when staff writer stories exceeded 80% of 
the total. Also, stories written by foreign wire services 
increased at this period. On the other hand, Japanese wire 
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Table 6. Number of stories written by various writers 
from 1937 to 1945 
Year 
Writer 1937 (%) 1941 (%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Staff 97 63. 4 119 68.0 102 80.3 129 68.3 447 69.4 
Domei 49 32. 0 44 25.1 15 11.8 48 25.4 156 24.2 
Other 
wiresa 
Total 
7 4. 6 12 6.9 10 7.9 12 6.3 41 6.4 
153 100. 0 175 100.0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 16.441, p < .02, df = 6. 
a
 "Other wires" includes: UP, AP, Reuters, Agence Francaise, 
and other/uncertain authorship. 
service stories were most frequently used in 1937, during 
the fall of Nanking, when foreign wire services were least 
frequently used. There was almost no difference in the 
authorship of stories written during Pearl Harbor in 1941 
and surrender in 1945. The Japanese newspapers probably had 
difficulty obtaining information directly from foreign wire 
services throughout the four periods, even though they 
continued to monitor the transmissions of those wire 
services. 
Emotional Techniques 
Emotional techniques employed in the stories illustrate 
how emotionally the stories appealed to the Japanese public. 
When the scores of emotional techniques are calculated 
on a scale of 1.0 (highly rational) to 4.0 (highly 
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emotional), the result of one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with a Scheffe test suggests that there was no 
significant difference in the mean scores of the three 
papers (Table 7). All three newspapers ranked between 1.92 
and 2.00, which means that they all were judged as 
relatively "rational," as opposed to "emotional." 
The change of the proportion of "emotional" and 
"rational" stories from 1937 to 1945 is described in Table 
8. According to the data, 71.4% of the stories were 
categorized as "rational." That is, "rational" stories 
Table 7. Mean Score of emotional techniques employed by 
three newspapers with ANOVA table 
Newspaper Total stories Total score Mean score3 
Asahi 226 453 2.00 
Yomiuri 198 395 1.99 
Mainichi 220 422 1.92 
Total 644 1,270 1.97 
Source df S.S.b M.S.C F ratio F prob. 
Between 2 .9791 .4895 .4751 .6221 
groups 
Within 641 660.5178 1.0304 
groups 
Total 643 661.4969 
3
 "Mean score" was calculated by: Highly rational = 1, 
somewhat rational = 2, somewhat emotional = 3, highly 
emotional = 4. 
b
 "S.S." refers to "sum of squares." 
c
 "M.S." refers to "mean squares." 
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Table 8. Number of emotional and rational stories 
Year 
Story 1937 (%) 1941 (%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Emotional 35 22.9 39 22.3 48 37.8 62 32.8 184 28.6 
Rational 118 77.1 136 77.6 79 62.2 127 67.2 460 71.4 
Total 153 100.0 175 100.0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 12.751, p < .01, df = 3. 
appeared 2.5 times more frequently than did "emotional" 
stories (28.6%). The result of a chi square test shows that 
there was a significant difference among the observed 
frequencies of emotional techniques. The most distinctive 
change occurred in 1942, the Battle of Midway, when the 
percentage of "emotional" stories increased to 37.8%, while 
the percentage of "rational" stories dropped to 62.2%. 
Although the percentage of "emotional" stories slightly 
declined at the final stage, the result may suggest that 
"emotional" stories were more likely to be used when Japan 
experienced military losses than when the military situation 
was favorable to Japan. Therefore, Subhypothesis A was 
partly supported in this analysis. 
Table 9 describes the change in the number of 
"emotional" and "rational" stories in more detail. Of all 
the stories, 42.1% were "highly rational," while 29.3% were 
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categorized as "somewhat rational." Only 10.7 % of stories 
fell into the "highly emotional" category. 
During the first two stages, more than 77% of the 
stories were "highly" or "somewhat rational." The 
percentage dropped to about 65% in 1942 and 1945. This 
probably occurred for two reasons. First, Japan had not 
entered into a state of war with any foreign countries 
except China in 1937. Second, it can be assumed that the 
first two issues before the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 were 
likely to be "rational," carrying relatively objective 
reports about diplomatic negotiations, mainly with the 
United States. 
Table 9. Emotional techniques employed in stories from 
1937 to 1945 
Year 
Emotion 1937 (%) 1941 (%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Highly 69 45.1 87 49.7 33 26.0 82 43.4 271 42.1 
rational 
Somewhat 49 32.0 49 28.0 46 36.2 45 23.8 189 29.3 
rational 
Somewhat 25 16.4 23 13.1 26 20.5 41 21.7 115 17.9 
emotional 
Highly 10 6.5 16 9.2 22 17.3 21 11.1 69 10.7 
emotional 
Total 153 100.0 175 100.0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 27.672, p < .05, df = 9. 
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Interestingly, the percentage of "highly rational" 
stories dramatically decreased to 26.0% in 1942, while the 
other categories, "somewhat rational," "somewhat emotional," 
and "highly emotional," all increased by about 8% over 1941. 
From this result, it can be concluded that the newspapers 
carried "emotional" stories most frequently around the 
overwhelming defeat at the Battle of Midway. The same kind 
of trend was also found in 1945 with Japan's unconditional 
surrender, even though the degree of "emotional" appeals 
decreased, compared to that of 1942. 
Such a trend of emotional appeals is also shown in the 
four-point scores (Table 10). The results of one-way ANOVA 
with a Scheffe test indicate that the mean score of emotions 
significantly increased in 1942 (2.29) from that of 1937 
(1.84) and 1941 (1.82), although no significant difference 
was found between 1942 and 1945 (2.01) nor between 1937, 
1941, and 1945. This result does not statistically support 
Subhypothesis A, which assumed that "emotional" stories 
would be more frequently covered by the Japanese newspapers 
at "defeat" stages rather than at "victory" stages, even 
though the result of chi square indicates a significant 
difference among the four periods, and the observed trend 
was also in the same direction of the hypothesis. 
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Table 10. Scores of emotional techniques from 1937 to 1945 
with ANOVA table and Scheffe test 
Year Total stories Total score Mean score3 
1937 153 282 1.84 
1941 175 318 1.82 
1942 127 291 2.29 
1945 189 379 2.01 
Total 644 1,270 1.97 
Source df S.S.b M.S.C F ratio F prob. 
Between 3 19.8978 6.6326 6.6161 .0002 
groups 
Within 640 641.5990 1.0025 
groups 
Total 643 661.4969 
Mean Year 1941 1937 1945 1942 
1.82 1941 
1.84 1937 
2.01 1945 
2.29 1942 * * 
a
 "Mean score" was calculated by: Highly rational = 1, 
somewhat rational = 2, somewhat emotional = 3, highly 
emotional = 4. 
b
 "S.S." refers to "sum of squares." 
c
 "M.S." refers to "mean squares." 
Slant of Stories and Headlines 
The proportion of "slanted" and "unslanted" stories 
tells how objectively (or subjectively) the three Japanese 
newspapers presented their news reports. 
In percentage terms, Asahi used more "slanted" stories 
than the other two papers, while Mainichi was most likely to 
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Table 11. Slant of stories used by three newspapers 
Slant A (%) 
Newspaper 
Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
Slanted toward 78 34.5 53 26.8 64 29.1 195 30.3 
Japan/Axis 
Slanted against 14 6.2 22 11.1 15 6.8 51 7.9 
enemy 
Unslanted about 60 26.6 64 32.3 63 28.6 187 29.0 
Japan/Axis 
Unslanted about 55 24.3 41 20.7 56 25.5 152 23.6 
enemy 
Other 19 8.4 18 9.1 22 10.0 59 9.2 
Total 226 100.0 198 100.0 220 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 8.595, p N.S., df = 8. 
use "unslanted" stories (Table 11). However, a chi square 
test indicates that the frequencies of slanted stories 
carried by the three papers were not significantly 
different. This result may provide the statistical evidence 
for uniformity of the stories and news management employed 
by the three papers. 
With regard to the overall slant of stories, the result 
of a chi square test suggests that there was no significant 
difference among the frequencies of slant from 1937 to 1945 
(Table 12). Therefore, Subhypothesis B was rejected. 
However, the percentage of "slanted" stories increased to 
49.6% at the third stage, the Battle of Midway, and dropped 
to 39.7% at the fourth stage. Also, the percentage of 
"unslanted" stories was the highest (59.4%) at the second 
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Table 12. Number of slanted and unslanted stories 
Slant 1937 (%) 1941 
Year 
(%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Slanted 53 34.6 55 31.4 63 49.6 75 39.7 246 38.2 
Unslanted 84 54.9 104 59.4 53 41.7 98 51.8 339 52.6 
Other 16 10.5 16 9.2 11 8.7 16 8.5 59 9.2 
Total 153 100.0 175 100.0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 12.043, p N.S., df = 6. 
stage, the attack on Pearl Harbor. These trends were 
consistent with the emotional techniques discussed in the 
previous section. 
Table 13 shows a more detailed classification of slant 
of the stories. Of these, the percentage of "slanted" 
stories toward Japan or the Axis decreased from 31.4% in 
1937 to 24.0% in 1941 and increased to 40.2% in 1942, when 
Japan experienced devastating losses at the Battle of 
Midway. Then, it decreased, again, to 28.6% in 1945. On 
the other hand, the percentage of "slanted" stories against 
the enemy increased from 3.3% to 11.1% through the four 
periods. The distinctive change in "unslanted" stories also 
occurred in 1942, when the percentage of "unslanted/enemy" 
stories dramatically decreased. These trends showing that 
news stories were most likely to be "slanted" either toward 
Japan or against the enemy in 1942 may partly support 
Subhypothesis B, which assumed that slanted stories would 
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Table 13. Number of stories slanted toward Japan or Axis and 
against enemy 
Year 
Slant 1937 (%) 1941 (%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Slanted/ 48 31.4 42 24.0 51 40.2 54 28.6 195 30.3 
Axis 
Slanted/ 5 3.3 13 7.4 12 9.4 21 11.1 51 7.9 
enemy 
Unslanted/ 51 33.3 57 32.6 43 33.8 36 19.0 187 29.0 
Axis 
Unslanted/ 3 21.6 47 26.9 10 7.9 62 32.8 152 23.6 
enemy 
Other 16 10.4 16 9.1 11 8.7 16 8.5 59 9.2 
Total 153 100.0 175 100.0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 44.451, p < .001, df = 12. 
more frequently appear at the "defeated” stages than at the 
"victory" stages. However, the significant difference 
indicated by a chi square test was observed only in 1942, 
not among the other three periods. 
Unlike the categorization of slant of stories, 
headlines were divided into two groups: "slanted" or 
"unslanted." 
Table 14 and 15 illustrate the degree of slanted 
headlines that each newspaper used. There was, again, no 
significant difference among the three papers. Yomiuri used 
36.9% "slanted" headlines, followed by Asahi (35.0%) and 
Mainichi (33.2%). Although Asahi most frequently conveyed a 
slant in its stories, its use of "slanted" headlines was 
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Table 14. Slanted and unslanted headlines used by three 
newspapers 
Headline 
Newspaper 
A (%) Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
Slanted 
Unslanted 
79 35.0 73 
147 65.0 125 
36.9 
63.1 
73 33.2 
147 66.8 
225 
419 
34.9 
65.1 
Total 226 100.0 198 100.0 220 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 0.623 , p N.S., df = 2. 
Table 15. Slanted and unslanted headlines used from 1937 
to 1945 
Headline 
Year 
1937 (%) 1941 (%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Slanted 
Unslanted 
47 30.7 59 33. 
106 69.3 116 66. 
7 57 
3 70 
44.9 62 
55.1 127 
32.8 225 
67.2 419 
34.9 
65.1 
Total 153 100.0 175 100. 0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 7.216, p N.S., df = 3. 
relatively moderate. The lowest rate of Mainichi in the use 
of "slanted" headlines was consistent with its low rate of 
the use of "slanted" stories. 
According to the data shown in Table 15, the percentage 
of "slanted" headlines increased to 44.9% in 1942. This 
trend reflects the use of "slanted" stories by the three 
papers. However, there was little difference among the 
other three periods. The result of a chi square test 
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suggests that the frequencies of "slanted” and "unslanted" 
headlines through the four periods were not significantly 
different. Therefore, in terms of slant of headlines, 
Subhypothesis B was rejected. 
Overall, the proportion of "slanted" and "unslanted" 
stories and headlines did not significantly change through 
the four periods. A significant difference was observed in 
slant of stories only when the stories were classified into 
five categories. Although both "slanted" stories and 
headlines increased in 1942, they decreased in 1945, when 
the greatest slanting was expected. Since it was assumed 
that both "slanted" stories and headlines would increase 
through the four periods, Subhypothesis B, overall, was not 
supported in this analysis. 
With regard to the relationships between the degree of 
emotions and slant of stories and headlines, it was found 
that the more slant the Japanese newspapers conveyed in 
their stories and headlines, the higher the degree of 
emotions the writers expressed. For example, the result of 
one-way ANOVA with a Scheffe test suggests that there was a 
significant mean difference in the degree of emotions among 
three groups, "slanted" stories, "unslanted," and "other" 
(Table 16); that is, the degree of emotions observed in 
"slanted" stories was significantly higher than in both 
"unslanted" stories and "other." Likewise, there was a 
significant difference in the degree of emotions between the 
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Table 16. Scores of emotional techniques by slant of story 
with ANOVA table and Scheffe test 
Story Total stories Mean score3 
Slanted 246 3.02 
Unslanted 339 1.31 
Other 59 1.4? 
Total 644 1.92 
Source df S.S.b M.S.C F ratio F prob. 
Between 2 434.6773 217.3386 614.2064 .0000 
groups 
Within 641 226.8196 .3539 
groups 
Total 643 661.4969 
Mean Group Unslanted Other Slanted 
1.31 Unslanted 
1.42 Other 
3.02 Slanted ★ * 
a
 "Mean score" was calculated by: Highly rational = 1, 
somewhat rational = 2, somewhat emotional = 3, highly 
emotional = 4. 
b
 "S.S." refers to "sum of squares." 
c
 "M.S." refers to "mean squares." 
means of "slanted" and "unslanted" headlines (Table 17). 
These results may suggest that emotional appeals of the 
stories were closely related to the use of slant in the 
stories and headlines of the three newspapers. 
116 
Table 17. Scores of emotional techniques by slant of 
headline with ANOVA table3 
Headline Total stories Mean score*3 
Slanted 225 2.88 
Unslanted 419 1.49 
Total 644 2.18 
Source df S.S.C M.S.d F ratio F prob. 
Between 1 282.3035 282.3035 477.9590 .0000 
groups 
Within 642 379.1934 . 5906 
groups 
Total 643 661.4969 
a
 No range tests were performed with fewer than three non- 
empty groups. 
b
 "Mean score” was calculated by: Highly rational = 1, 
somewhat rational = 2, somewhat emotional = 3, highly 
emotional = 4. 
c
 "S.S.” refers to "sum of squares.” 
d
 "M.S." refers to "mean squares." 
Sources of Information 
In this section, the following three points are 
discussed: (1) the total number of information sources cited 
in the stories; (2) the variety of sources used, such as 
Japanese government, Japanese military, other Japanese, and 
foreign sources; and (3) the specificity of sources, such as 
sources with name and specific title, those identified by 
specific title without name, and those identified only by 
general title (i.e., government spokesman). 
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Overall, 509 sources were cited in the stories of the 
three papers (Table 18). The number of sources used by 
each newspaper was 188 for Asahi. 158 for Yomiuri. and 163 
for Mainichi. The average number of sources per story was 
.83 for Asahi, .80 for Yomiuri. and .74 for Mainichi. The 
result of one-way ANOVA with a Scheffe test shows that there 
was no significant difference in the means of the total 
number of sources used by the three newspapers. This 
suggests that the three newspapers followed the same trends 
in their individual use of sources in news stories. 
Table 18. Total and average number of sources cited in 
stories by three newspapers with ANOVA table 
Newspaper Total stories Total sources3 Average sources 
Asahi 226 188 .83 
Yomiuri 198 158 .80 
Mainichi 220 163 .74 
Total 644 509 .79 
Source df S.Sb M.S.C F ratio F prob. 
Between 2 .9387 .4693 .5336 .5867 
groups 
Within 641 563.7616 .8795 
groups 
Total 643 564.7003 
a
 "Total sources" were determined by counting all sources 
mentioned in all stories. 
b
 "S.S." refers to "sum of squares. 
c
 "M.S." refers to "mean squares." 
•• 
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Table 19. Sources cited in stories per category 
N of sources A (%) 
Newspaper 
Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
0 100 44.2 92 46.5 95 43.2 287 44.6 
1 87 38.5 73 36.9 97 44.1 257 39.9 
2 26 11.5 21 10.6 21 9.5 68 10.5 
3 5 2.2 7 3.5 5 2.2 17 2.6 
4 6 2.7 3 1.5 1 .5 10 1.6 
5 2 .9 2 1.0 1 .5 5 .8 
Total 226 100.0 198 100.0 220 100.0 644 100.0 
Of the 644 stories studied, 287 (44.6%) appeared 
without any sources being cited by name or title (Table 19). 
Another 257, or 39.9%, were single-source stories. This 
means that 84.5% of all of the stories studied cited one or 
no sources. There were 68 stories containing two sources 
(10.5%), while only 32, or 5.0%, cited three or more 
sources. 
Table 20 shows the frequencies and percentage of 
sources used from 1937 to 1945. Single-source stories were 
most frequently covered in 1942 (46.5%), while there was 
little difference among the other three periods, ranging 
from 36.0% to 39.7%. The amount of stories with more than 
two sources increased from 5.2% in 1937 to 20.6% in 1941; 
then, for the next two periods, they decreased to 17.3% and 
to 18.0%, respectively. This result indicates that fewer 
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Table 20. Number of sources used in stories from 1937 to 
1945 
Source 1937 (%) 1941 
Year 
(%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
0 85 55.6 76 43.4 46 36.2 80 42.3 287 44.6 
1 60 39.2 63 36.0 59 46.5 75 39.7 257 39.9 
2 5 3.3 23 13.1 15 11.8 25 13.2 68 10.5 
3 2 1.3 5 2.9 5 3.9 5 2.7 17 2.6 
4 1 . 6 5 2.9 - - 4 2.1 10 1.6 
5 ■“ 3 1.7 2 1.6 5 .8 
Total 153 100.0 175 100.0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
sources were cited in stories appearing in 1937 than in 
comparable stories during the other three periods. 
This trend is more clearly illustrated in Table 21. 
The average number of sources increased at the second stage, 
the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, and held steady during the 
Midway period. A slight drop occurred between 1942 and 
1945. The result of one-way ANOVA with a Scheffe test 
suggests that a significant mean difference was observed 
among the four periods. However, such a difference appeared 
only in 1937, and no significant difference was found among 
the other three periods. Therefore, Subhypothesis C, which 
assumed that the total number of sources cited in the 
stories would decrease as Japan experienced military losses, 
was not supported in this analysis. 
With regard to the number of stories without sources of 
information, a chi square test indicates a significant 
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Table 21. Average number of sources used from 1937 to 1945 
with ANOVA table and Scheffe test 
Year Total stories Total sources Average sources 
1937 153 80 .52 
1941 175 159 .91 
1942 127 114 .90 
1945 189 156 .83 
Total 644 509 .79 
Source df S.S.a M.S.b F ratio F prob. 
Between 3 15.0858 5.0286 5.8556 .0006 
groups 
Within 640 549.6145 .8588 
groups 
Total 643 564.7003 
Mean Year 1937 1945 1942 1941 
.52 
.83 
1937 
1945 * 
.90 1942 ★ 
.91 1941 ★ 
? "S.S." refers to "sum of squares." 
b
 "M.S." refers to "mean squares." 
difference through the four periods (Table 22). Of the 287 
stories without sources (44.6% of the total), the highest 
percentage was recorded in 1937 (55.6%). The percentage 
dropped to 43.4% in 1941 and to 36.2% in 1942, but increased 
to 42.3% in 1945. This result suggests that Japanese 
newspapers were least likely to cover stories with no 
sources around the defeat at the Battle of Midway. This may 
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Table 22. Number and percentage of stories without sources 
from 1937 to 1945 
Story 1937 (%) 1941 
Year 
(%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
No source 85 55.6 76 43.4 46 36.2 80 42.3 287 44.6 
With 68 44.4 99 56.6 81 63.8 109 57.7 357 55.4 
source 
Total 153 100.0 175 100.0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
X2 = 11.517, p < .01, df = 3. 
Table 23. Stories naming no sources from 1937 to 1945 
Newspaper 
Year A (%) Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
1937 36 36.0 24 26.1 25 26. 3 85 29.6 
1941 22 22.0 28 30.4 26 27. 4 76 26.5 
1942 16 16.0 14 15.2 16 16. 8 46 16.0 
1945 26 26.0 26 28.3 28 29. 5 80 27.9 
Total 100 100.0 92 100.0 95 100. 0 287 100.0 
X2 = 3.717, p N.S., df = 6. 
reflect the government's intense desire to manage the news 
in a time of crisis. When individual papers are considered, 
Asahi most frequently carried stories without sources in 
1937, while Yomiuri did in 1941 and Mainichi in 1945 (Table 
23). All three papers least frequently used no-source 
stories in 1942. The percentage of no-source stories 
increased in 1945, but only to earlier levels. On the 
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whole, however, no significant difference was observed among 
the three papers. 
Second, it was found that the variety of sources of 
information used was not significantly different among the 
three papers (Table 24). Of all the Japanese sources cited, 
over 90% were Japanese government and military sources. In 
fact, Yomiuri cited no other Japanese sources. This result 
confirms how effectively the government controlled the news¬ 
gathering activities of the press. Of the three papers, 
Mainichi was slightly more inclined to use military sources 
and slightly less inclined to use Japanese government 
sources in its stories than the other two papers. 
Surprisingly, however, more than half of all sources 
cited in the stories were foreign sources. This may suggest 
Table 24. Variety of sources used by three newspapers 
Source A (%) 
Newspaper 
Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
Japanese 37 19.7 30 19.0 26 16.0 93 18.3 
government 
Japanese 48 25.5 45 28.5 50 30.7 143 28.1 
military 
Other 9 4.8 - - 4 2.4 13 2.5 
Japanese 
Foreign 94 50.0 83 52.5 83 50.9 260 51.1 
Total 188 100.0 158 100.0 163 100.0 509 100.0 
X2 = 5.363, p N.S., df = 6. 
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that the Japanese press tried to provide the public with 
information about the outside world during the global crisis 
situation, despite the difficulty of gaining information 
from foreign countries. At the same time, it should be also 
remembered that such information was probably being 
manipulated by the United News Agency (Domei), because all 
the information from outside was transmitted through its 
communication channels and it was operating under the same 
censorship restrictions as the major newspapers. 
The classification of the variety of sources according 
to the four time periods is shown in Table 25. A chi square 
test suggests that there was no significant difference among 
the frequencies of the use of the varied sources from 1937 
to 1945. Therefore, Subhypothesis D was rejected. 
Table 25. Variety of sources used from 1937 to 1945 
Source 1937 (%) 1941 
Year 
(%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Japanese 13 16.3 31 19.5 27 23.7 22 14.1 93 18.3 
government 
Japanese 31 38.7 36 22.6 24 21.0 52 33.3 143 28.1 
military 
Other 2 2.5 4 2.5 1 .9 6 3.9 13 2.5 
Japanese 
Foreign 34 42.5 88 55.4 62 54.4 76 48.7 260 51.1 
Total 80 100.0 159 100.0 114 100.0 156 100.0 509 100.0 
X2 = 16.468, p N.S., df - 9. 
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In fact, the percentage of Japanese government sources 
decreased in 1945, while the number of military sources 
increased. The percentage of foreign sources decreased in 
1945, but the increased percentage of "other Japanese" 
sources contradicts the research assumption that the variety 
of sources cited in the stories would decrease as Japan 
experienced more military losses. 
Interestingly, the ratio of Japanese government to 
military sources swung impressively. During the fall of 
Nanking, military sources outnumbered government sources by 
two to one. The same occurred with the surrender in 1945, 
but for the attack on Pearl Harbor and the defeat at Midway, 
military and government sources were closely clustered. 
Finally, the sources used in the stories were divided 
into three groups according to specificity: name and 
specific title; specific title without name; and general 
title only. 
No significant difference in the frequencies of the 
specificity of sources was observed among the three 
newspapers (Table 26). That is, they were all likely to 
identify sources in the same style for their stories. In 
general terms, readers were given names and titles 34.4% of 
the time; they at least knew the title (but not the name) of 
the source 48.1% of the time. Only 17.5% of the sources 
were identified only by a general title. 
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Table 26. Specificity of sources used by three newspapers 
Source A (%) 
Newspaper 
Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
Name 72 38.3 45 28.5 58 35.6 175 34.4 
Title 82 43.6 85 53.8 78 47.8 245 48.1 
General 34 18.1 28 17.7 27 16.6 89 17.5 
Total 188 100.0 158 100.0 163 100.0 509 100.0 
X2 = 4.476, p N.S II 
4-1
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Asahi was slightly more likely to identify sources 
specifically (38.3%) than the other two, but it was also 
slightly more inclined to resort to general titles (18.1%). 
Asahi and Mainichi were very similar in their identification 
of sources. Yomiuri. on the other hand, was less inclined 
toward specific names (28.5%), but more inclined than the 
others to use specific titles (53.8%). 
Surprisingly, the Japanese newspapers were twice as 
inclined to use sources with name and a specific title than 
they were to identify them only by a general title. There 
was little difference among the three papers in their 
relative use of general-source identification. 
Table 27 was created to determine if any significant 
changes in the frequencies of the specificity of sources 
occurred through the four periods. The result of chi square 
suggests that there was no significant change of the 
frequencies from 1937 to 1945; therefore, Subhypothesis E 
Table 27. Specificity of sources used from 1937 to 1945 
Source 1937 (%) 1941 
Year 
(%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Name 28 35.0 42 26.4 42 36.8 63 40.4 175 34.4 
Title 42 52.5 84 52.8 52 45.6 67 42.9 245 48.1 
General 10 12.5 33 20.8 20 17.6 26 16.7 89 17.5 
Total 80 100.0 159 100.0 114 100.0 156 100.0 509 100.0 
X2 = 9.066, p < N.S. ., df = 6. 
was rejected. Indeed, the percentage of the use of sources 
identified by name and a specific title increased over time, 
while the proportion of "specific title" and "general title" 
decreased. These trends are in the opposite direction of 
the research assumption that more general sources would be 
used as Japan experienced more military losses after the 
defeat at the Battle of Midway. 
Attitude 
The overall attitudes of the stories were examined 
based on two main points: attitudes of the stories toward 
the enemy (the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and 
China) and attitudes toward the Axis allies (Germany, Italy, 
and Japan). 
There were 566 stories that showed any attitudes toward 
the enemy in 60 issues of the three Japanese newspapers from 
1937 to 1945 (Table 28). Over 60% of those attitudes were 
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Table 28. Attitudes of three newspapers toward enemy 
Attitude A (%) 
Newspaper 
Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
Anti- 126 62.4 107 63.3 113 58.0 346 61.1 
Neutral 73 36.1 59 34.9 79 40.5 211 37.3 
Pro- 3 1.5 3 1.8 3 1.5 9 1.6 
Total 202 100.0 169 100.0 195 100.0 566 100.0 
X2 = 1.301a, 
a
 Chi square 
p N. 
was 
S., df = 2. 
calculated after > collapsing "; neutral" and 
"pro-." 
Table 29. Attitudes of three newspapers toward Axis 
Attitude A (%) 
Newspaper 
Y (%) M (%) Total (%) 
Anti- 1 .6 1 .6 2 1.2 4 .8 
Neutral 53 31.5 55 35.5 55 34.0 163 33.6 
Pro- 114 67.9 99 63.9 105 64.8 318 65.6 
Total 168 100.0 155 100.0 162 100.0 485 100.0 
X2 = .615a, p N.S., df = 2. 
a
 Chi square was calculated after collapsing "anti-" and 
"neutral." 
"anti-," and 37.3% were "neutral." Only 1.6% showed "pro-" 
attitudes toward the enemy. Yomiuri had the highest rate 
(63.3%) of "anti-" attitudes against the enemy, followed by 
Asahi (62.4%). Of the three papers, Mainichi was most 
likely to carry stories with "neutral" attitudes. However, 
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there was no significant difference in the attitudes of the 
three newspapers toward the enemy. 
On the other hand, the attitudes of the stories toward 
the Axis powers were almost twice as likely to be "pro-,” 
rather than "neutral" (Table 29). The "pro-" attitudes 
toward the Axis exceeded 65%. As with the previous 
category, no significant difference was found in the 
attitudes of the three newspapers toward the Axis. 
The attitudes of news stories toward individual 
countries are shown in Table 30 and 31. Of all the stories 
that indicated any attitudes toward the enemy, 41.2% dealt 
with the United States, followed by China (25.8%), Great 
Britain (24.0%) and Russia (9.0%). From this result, it can 
be concluded that Japan considered the United States the 
most important country in terms of its diplomatic 
negotiations and war situations from 1937 to 1945. China 
got more mentions than Great Britain, probably because China 
had been the only enemy for Japan until the beginning of the 
Pacific War in 1941 and, therefore, got more attention from 
the Japanese press than did Great Britain in 1937. 
Likewise, Russia had been a neutral country until its 
declaration of war against Japan in August, 1945, so it got 
much less attention from the Japanese press than did the 
other three countries. 
These trends are reflected in the proportion of 
negative attitudes in stories toward the individual enemies. 
Table 30. Attitudes of stories toward individual enemy 
Attitude USA (%) BRI 
Country 
(%) RUS (%) CHI (%) Total (%) 
Anti- 147 63.1 91 66.9 24 47.1 84 57.5 346 61.1 
Neutral 85 36.5 44 32.4 27 52.9 55 37.7 211 37.3 
Pro- 1 .4 1 .7 7 4.8 9 1.6 
Total 233 100.0 136 100.0 51 100.0 146 100.0 566 100.0 
More than 60% of the stories that showed any attitudes 
toward the U.S. and Britain were categorized as "anti-," 
followed by 57.5% of the stories about China. With regard 
to Russia, the treatment was slightly more "neutral" (52.9%) 
than "anti-" (47.1%). Although the percentage of "anti-" 
stories against Britain was higher than that of the U.S., 
the latter was much more frequently mentioned and there was 
little difference in the attitudes toward the two countries. 
Of the three countries of the Axis, Japan dominated 
nearly 90% of all the stories that showed any attitudes 
toward the Axis powers (Table 31). Not surprisingly, 67.4% 
of those stories indicated a "pro-" attitude toward Japan. 
Only two stories (.4%) that criticized the Japanese 
government or military policies were found in the coverage 
of the three papers from 1937 to 1945. However, only about 
50% of the attitudes toward Germany and Italy fell into the 
category of "pro-." Indeed, there were only 16 stories 
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Table 31. Attitudes of stories toward individual Axis powers 
Attitude GER (%) 
Country 
ITA (%) JAP (%) Total (%) 
Anti- 2 5.0 2 .4 4 .8 
Neutral 17 42.5 8 50.0 138 32.2 163 33.6 
Pro- 21 52.5 8 50.0 289 67.4 318 65.6 
Total 40 100.0 16 100.0 429 100.0 485 100.0 
showing any attitudes toward Italy: Half were "neutral" and 
half were "pro-Rome." Germany enjoyed slightly more support 
(52.5%), but two of the 40 stories (5.0%) were critical, or 
"anti-Berlin." This result may suggest that the Japanese 
press tended to emphasize the "strength" or "justice" of 
Japan itself, rather than publicize cooperation among the 
Axis countries. 
Overall, it was confirmed that attitudes of the stories 
toward both the enemy and the Axis significantly changed 
through the four time periods (Table 32 and 33). For 
example, the percentage of stories which expressed "anti-" 
attitudes against the enemy markedly increased in 1941 
(55.8%) and in 1942 (81.4%), dropping to 63.9% in 1945. On 
the other hand, "pro-" attitudes toward the Axis recorded a 
relatively high percentage (68.1%) in 1937, increased to 
75.2% in 1942, but decreased in 1941 (58.4%) and 1945 
(61.5%). That is, both "anti-" attitudes toward the enemy 
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Table 32. Attitudes of stories toward enemy from 1937 to 
1945 
Attitude 1937 ' (%) 1941 
Year 
(%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Anti- 35 38.5 91 55.8 96 81.4 124 63.9 346 61.1 
Neutral 50 54.9 70 43.0 22 18.6 69 35.6 211 37.3 
Pro- 6 6.6 2 1.2 1 .5 9 1.6 
Total 91 100.0 163 100.0 118 100.0 194 100.0 566 100.0 
X2 = 31.329a, p < .001, df = 3. 
a
 Chi square was calculated after collapsing "neutral" and 
"pro-." 
Table 33. Attitudes toward Axis powers from 1937 to 1945 
Year 
Attitude 1937 (%) 1941 (%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
Anti- 1 .9 3 2.3 4 .8 
Neutral 35 31.0 52 41.6 29 24.8 47 36.2 163 33.6 
Pro- 77 68.1 73 58.4 88 75.2 80 61.5 318 65.6 
Total 113 100.0 125 100.0 117 100.0 130 100.0 485 100.0 
X2 = 8.955a, p < .05, df = 3. 
a
 Chi square was calculated after collapsing "anti-" and 
"neutral." 
and "pro-" attitudes toward the Axis were the highest in 
1942. 
The fact that the most distinctive change occurred in 
1942 was consistent with the observed trends of other 
variables, such as emotions, slant of stories and headlines, 
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and the variety and specificity of sources. However, the 
research assumption in terms of the attitudes of stories was 
that both of "anti-" feeling against the enemy and "pro-" 
feeling toward the Axis would be the highest in 1945, 
increasing from the first period to the final period of the 
war. Therefore, Subhypothesis F was not supported. 
Strong Negative Words* 
Overall, 205 strong negative words or statements 
against the enemy were found in this analysis (Table 34). 
Of the three newspapers, Mainichi most frequently used those 
words or statements. Its stories contained 44.4% of the 
total. The other two were: Yomiuri (28.8%) and Asahi 
(26.8%). The average number of strong negative words used 
in each story of the three papers came to be .41 for 
Mainichi. .30 for Yomiuri. and .24 for Asahi. The result of 
one-way ANOVA with a Scheffe test suggests that there was no 
significant difference in the mean scores of the three 
papers. 
From 1937 to 1945, the average number of strong 
negative words or statements used in the stories increased 
from .10 in 1937 to .33 in 1941 and .44 in 1942. It then 
slightly decreased to .40 in 1945 (Table 35). The result of 
* The examples of strong negative words will be described in 
the next chapter. 
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Table 34. Strong negative words or statements used by 
three newspapers with ANOVA table 
Newspaper N of stories N of words (%) Mean score 
Asahi 226 55 26.8 .24 
Yomiuri 198 59 28.8 .30 
Mainichi 220 91 44.4 .41 
Total 644 205 100.0 . 32 
Source df s.s.a M.S.b F ratio F prob. 
Between 2 3.3505 1.6752 1. 7088 .1819 
groups 
Within 641 628.3933 .9803 
groups 
Total 643 631.7438 
a
 "S.S." refers to "sum of squares." 
b
 "M.S." refers to "mean squares." 
one-way ANOVA with a Scheffe test suggests that the mean 
scores of strong negative words of 1942 and 1945 were 
significantly larger than that of 1937. No significant 
difference was found between 1937 and 1941, or among 1941, 
1942 and 1945. From this finding, Subhypothesis G, which 
assumed that the more Japan suffered military losses, the 
more strong negative words would be used by the three 
Japanese newspapers, was not statistically supported. 
However, the observed trend showed that the three newspapers 
used more negative words against the enemy at the "defeat" 
stages (1942 and 1945) than they did at "victory" stages 
(1937 and 1941). 
Table 35. Strong negative words or statements used from 1937 
to 1945 with ANOVA table and Scheffe test 
Year N Of stories N of words Mean score 
1937 153 15 . 10 
1941 175 58 .33 
1942 127 56 .44 
1945 189 76 .40 
Total 644 205 . 32 
Source df S.S.a M.S.b F ratio F prob. 
Between 3 10.6910 3.5637 3.6724 .0121 
groups 
Within 640 621.0528 .9704 
groups 
Total 643 631.7438 
Mean Year 1937 1941 1945 1942 
. 10 1937 
.33 1941 
.40 1945 ★ 
.44 1942 ★ 
a
 "S.S." refers to "sum of squares." 
® "M.S." refers to "mean squares." 
Overall Category 
This study also examined the overall categories of 
propaganda emphases in the stories covered by the three 
Japanese newspapers from 1937 to 1945. All stories were 
exclusively categorized into twelve groups based on their 
primary emphasis (Table 36). 
135 
Among the twelve categories, "war news" recorded the 
highest percentage (28.0%) of frequency. This trend 
continued through the four periods. It decreased from 30.7% 
in 1937 to 25.1% in 1941, and slightly increased to 26.0% in 
1942 and then to 29.6% in 1945. The high percentages were 
probably caused by the four-day long battle at Nanking in 
1937 and the sustained air raids on Japan's homeland in 
1945. 
The same general trend was observed for stories dealing 
with the "strength of Japanese material or morale." From a 
high of 20.3% in 1937, the percentage dropped dramatically 
to 8.6% in 1941. The percentages increased and leveled at 
14.2% in 1942 and 14.3% in 1945. This finding indicates 
that the newspapers strongly emphasized the "strength" of 
Japanese material and morale in the China campaign, but not 
at the Pearl Harbor attack. On the other hand, "strength of 
the Axis powers" stories were mainly covered in 1942. Only 
four of these stories appeared from 1937 to 1941. And, of 
course, none of them was found in the issues of August, 
1945—after the surrender of Germany and Italy. 
Interestingly, the Japanese press still tried to publicize 
"Japan's strength" in the final period, despite the 
desperate situation the Japanese people were facing. 
Stories related to "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere" and other ideological themes increased in 1941 and 
1942, then slightly decreased in 1945. Thus, the ideology 
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Table 36. Overall category of propaganda emphases employed 
in all stories from 1937 to 1945 
Category 1937 (%) 1941 
Year 
(%) 1942 (%) 1945 (%) Total (%) 
War news 47 30.7 44 25.1 33 26.0 56 29.6 180 28.0 
Strength 
of Japan 
31 20.3 15 8.6 18 14.2 27 14.3 91 14.1 
Strength 
of Axis 
1 . 6 3 1.7 12 9.4 16 2.5 
Greater 
East Asia 
3 2.0 12 6.9 10 7.9 11 5.8 36 5.6 
Domestic 
(non-war) 
14 9.2 24 13.7 26 20.5 13 6.9 77 12.0 
Foreign 
(non-war) 
16 10.5 18 10.3 8 6.3 39 20.6 81 12.6 
Weakness 
of U.S. 
11 6.3 3 2.3 14 2.2 
Weakness 
of Britain 
4 2.3 2 1.6 1 .5 7 1.1 
Weakness 
of enemy 
5 3.2 3 1.7 6 4.7 5 2.7 19 3.0 
Fear story — — — 2 1.6 11 5.8 13 2.0 
Miscell. 
(war) 
35 22.9 38 21.7 5 3.9 14 7.4 92 14.3 
Miscell. 
(non-war) 
1 0.6 3 1.7 2 1.6 12 6.3 18 2.8 
Total 153 100.0 175 100.0 127 100.0 189 100.0 644 100.0 
which called for ’'cooperation among Asians" was more 
frequently used during the period from the Pearl Harbor 
attack to the Battle of Midway, though it still appeared 
immediately before the surrender. 
It was observed that the proportion of non-war related 
news changed in the different patterns through the four 
periods. For example, "domestic (non-war) news" increased 
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from 9.2% in 1937 to 13.7% in 1941 and to 20.5% in 1942, 
then dramatically decreased to 6.9% in 1945. On the other 
hand, "foreign (non-war) news" stories decreased from 10.5% 
in 1937 and 10.3% in 1941 to 6.3% in 1942, but markedly 
increased to 20.6% in 1945. These two patterns were almost 
completely reversed, especially in 1942 and 1945. One 
logical explanation for this may be that, by 1945, every air 
raid brought the war home in an unprecedented way so that it 
would have been almost impossible for domestic news 
reporting to ignore the military situation. 
The proportion of stories about the "weakness or 
wickedness of the enemy" also showed different patterns. 
The total percentage of the frequencies increased from 3.2% 
in 1937 to 10.3% in 1941, then dropped to 8.6% in 1942 and 
to 3.2% in 1945. The two categories, "weakness or 
wickedness" of the U.S. and Britain, followed the same 
pattern, but "weakness or wickedness" stories about other 
enemies (China, Russia, etc.) decreased from 3.2% in 1937 to 
1.7% in 1941, increased to 4.7% in 1942, and, again, 
decreased to 2.7% in 1945. This unique pattern probably 
occurred because the U.S. and Britain became the primary 
opponent of Japan after the beginning of the Pacific War in 
1941. The relatively high percentage of "weakness and 
wickedness" of other enemies stories appeared in 1937 and 
1942 because of the following two reasons: First, China had 
been the only enemy for Japan before 1941, so it got more 
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negative comments than did others. Second, the main topics 
covered by the three papers in 1942 were Japanese 
"victories" at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Sydney 
Bay attack; therefore, they described the U.S., Britain and 
Australia as a collective enemy. 
"Fear stories"—about the atrocities or war crimes 
committed by the enemy—appeared only after the defeat at 
the Battle of Midway in 1942, and none occurred in 1937 and 
1941. Of the 13 stories found, two appeared in 1942 and 
eleven in 1945. The marked increase of this kind of story 
in 1945 was a clear function of the atomic bombs dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Finally, "miscellaneous" stories related to the war 
were more frequently covered at "victory" stages (22.9% in 
1937 and 21.7% in 1941) than at "defeat" stages (3.9% in 
1942 and 7.4% in 1945). On the other hand, non-war 
"miscellaneous" stories increased in 1945, while they hardly 
changed from 1937 to 1942. This trend might be caused by 
the decrease of victory news which accompanied general 
stories about Japanese soldiers at the battle front, as 
Japan experienced more military losses, especially after the 
overwhelming defeat at the Battle of Midway in June, 1942. 
It was also observed that such stories tended to be replaced 
by more practical information at the final period, such as 
stories on food distribution, nutrition, gardening and fire 
prevention. 
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Charles Lomas' study, which analyzed the content of 
Domei (the United News Agency) transmissions in the occupied 
Asian areas from 1944 to 1945, found that the basic pattern 
of Japanese propaganda emphases "had undergone radical 
alternations" during this period.1 A summary of his 
findings was as follows: First, "Japanese strength" stories 
increased in 1945, substituting for factual reporting of war 
news. Second, "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" 
and other ideological themes completely disintegrated in 
1945. Third, stories about the "weakness of the enemy" 
markedly increased in 1945, while only a slight increase of 
"wickedness of the enemy" stories was observed. Finally, 
some miscellaneous and unslanted material appeared in 1945, 
while none was found in 1944. 
When compared to Lomas' study, the observed trends of 
propaganda emphases in this study suggest two similarities 
and two differences between Japanese domestic and foreign 
propaganda. First, "strength of Japanese material and 
morale" stories did not increase in the coverage of domestic 
newspapers in 1945. Second, "weakness and wickedness of the 
enemy" stories did not, again, increase at the final period, 
while Lomas observed the marked increase of those stories 
from 1944 to 1945. Third, stories dealing with ideological 
themes decreased during the final stage of the war, as 
observed by Lomas. Finally, the total percentage of 
"miscellaneous" stories (war-related and non-war) increased 
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from 5.5% in 1942 to 13.7% in 1945. This result was 
consistent with Lomas' finding that miscellaneous material 
increased in 1945. However, those stories were more 
frequently found in 1937 and 1941 than in the last two 
periods in this study. 
Obviously, the comparison of the two studies is 
somewhat tentative because of the different time periods 
examined. However, at least in some points, it can be 
assumed that Japanese propagandists employed different 
propaganda emphases in their domestic and foreign efforts 
during the war, in order to fit the different demands of 
their primary audiences in the occupied areas and homeland. 
Discussions of General Hypotheses 
It was expected in this research that fewer 
restrictions on the press would be observed during the first 
period, the fall of Nanking, in 1937; that is, stories would 
tend to be more factual and unbiased, with more sources of 
information (Hypothesis 1). However, no statistical 
evidence was found to support this assumption. 
For example, the degree of emotion expressed in the 
stories during this period was not significantly lower than 
that of 1941 and 1945. Slanted headlines were least 
frequently used in 1937, but the use of slanted stories was 
higher than that of 1941. The total number of sources was 
the lowest during this period, with the highest rate of the 
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use of non-source stories, while the highest frequencies of 
the use sources was expected. Also, Japanese government and 
military sources were most frequently used in 1937, which 
means that less varied sources were used then than in the 
other three periods. Only the result concerning the 
specificity of sources partly supported the hypothesis, 
because the sources identified only by general title were 
least frequently used during this period. However, no 
statistical significance was observed in the change in 
specificity of sources from 1937 to 1945. The attitudes of 
stories toward the enemy were more likely to be "neutral" 
than in the other three periods, but those expressed toward 
the Axis were more "pro-" than those of 1941 and 1945. 
Therefore, it was not confirmed that the stories covered 
during the "victory" period would be more factual and 
unbiased. 
During the second period, the Pearl Harbor attack in 
1941, it was expected that fewer sources and more emotional 
and biased stories would be employed than in 1937, because 
there would be more fear and less confidence about the 
outcome among the Japanese public after the United States 
and Great Britain declared war against Japan (Hypothesis 2). 
However, no statistical evidence was provided for this 
hypothesis. In fact, some analyses suggested the opposite 
directions of content trends from those hypothesized. 
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For example, the use of foreign wire service stories 
increased from 1937 to 1941, while the expected trend was 
that their use would decrease over time. Likewise, the 
degree of emotion and slant of stories decreased in 1941, 
even though slanted headlines were more frequently used by 
the papers than in 1937. Also, total number and variety of 
sources increased from 1937 to 1945, as opposed to the 
research assumption. The expected trends were observed only 
in the decrease of the specificity of sources and in the 
increase of "anti-" attitudes toward the enemy and of the 
number of strong negative words. These results suggest that 
the coverage by newspapers during this period was more 
likely to be "rational" and unbiased with more sources of 
information than that of 1937. 
The most distinctive changes occurred in 1942 with the 
Battle of Midway (see Figure 1). Fewer stories appeared on 
front pages during this period than during the other three 
periods. This means that the length of stories on the front 
page dramatically increased. At the same time, the stories 
were more likely to be emotional and slanted. Also, more 
stories were written by Japanese writers (the newspapers' 
own staff or the United News Agency). These results suggest 
that more strict press controls were exercised during this 
period than ever before, if only because Tokyo had to deal 
with its first significant setback in five years. 
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The newspapers employed a higher degree of emotional 
techniques than they did during the other three periods. 
Such trends were accompanied by the highest use of slanted 
stories and headlines, because a statistical analysis 
indicates that the more the stories conveyed slant in their 
stories and headlines, the higher was the degree of emotion 
expressed by writers. Also, both "anti-” attitudes toward 
the enemy and "pro-" attitudes toward the Axis increased 
during this period, with a notable increase of strong 
negative words criticizing the enemy. 
On the other hand, the expected change of content 
trends from 1937 to 1942 was not observed in the analyses of 
sources cited in the stories. For example, there was little 
difference in the total number of sources cited between 1941 
and 1942. In fact, the total number of sources used in 1942 
was much higher than that in 1937. Also, the use of non¬ 
source stories dramatically decreased in 1942, as opposed to 
the assumption that fewer sources would be cited in defeats 
than during the "victory" periods. The variety of sources 
followed the same pattern: It slightly decreased from 1941 
to 1942, but was much higher than that of 1937. The finding 
that the newspapers more frequently identified their sources 
by name and specific title in 1942 than in 1941 also 
contradicted the expected trend of the research assumption. 
Overall, Hypothesis 3, which stated that a higher level 
of press restrictions and emotional appeals would be 
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employed in the three newspapers than ever before, was 
partly supported in this study. Although the total number, 
variety, and specificity of sources increased in 1942 when 
compared to those of 1937 or 1941, a higher degree of 
emotions and of slant of stories and headlines were 
observed. Probably, the increase of strong negative words 
contributed to these distinctive changes. As a result, 
attitudes toward the enemy came to be more inclined toward 
"anti-" feeling, while those toward the Axis allies showed 
more "pro-" tendency. In fact, in most cases, statistical 
significance was found only during this period, not among 
the others. 
On the other hand, Hypothesis 4 was not supported in 
this study. The content trends expected by the hypothesis 
were that the greatest restrictions on the press and the 
most emotional and biased tone of all four periods would be 
observed during this final period of the war, August 1945, 
because of the desperate situation in which Japan 
experienced tremendous military losses and increased air 
raids in its homeland. This situation was reflected in the 
change of the kind of stories, where "domestic/war" news 
dramatically increased and "foreign/war" stories decreased. 
However, the result of hypothesis-testing revealed that, in 
most analyses, there was no significant difference between 
1942 and 1945, or even among 1937, 1941, and 1945. 
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For example, emotional appeals expressed in stories 
decreased from 1942 to 1945, although they were greater than 
those of 1937 and 1941. The use of slanted stories followed 
the same pattern, but slanted headlines were less frequently 
used than in 1941. Although the total number and variety of 
sources slightly decreased from 1942 to 1945, with the 
increase of non-source stories, the specificity of sources 
increased during the same period. The number of strong 
negative words also declined in 1945, and this change was 
accompanied by the decrease of both "anti-" attitudes toward 
the enemy and "pro-" attitudes toward the Axis. Such 
observed trends indicate that the three newspapers covered 
more emotional and slanted stories at the "defeat" stages 
than at the "victory" stages, but no statistical evidence 
was found in the difference between 1937, 1941, and 1945. 
Finally, the uniformity of the coverage by the three 
newspapers which was expected by Hypothesis 5 was 
statistically supported in this analysis. No significant 
differences were observed among the three papers on such 
quantitative analyses as to the kind of stories, writer, 
degree of emotion, slant of stories and headlines, total 
number and variety and specificity of sources, attitudes 
toward the enemy and the Axis, and the number of strong 
negative words. These results may suggest that state 
controls were so effective that the Japanese press uniformly 
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VIII. QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
Although the primary thrust of this thesis has been a 
quantitative analysis of content, sources, and emotional 
words, qualitative assessments were also made in an attempt 
to capture the depth and intensity of the language employed 
by the three Japanese newspapers during the four selected 
time periods under study. In this sense, qualitative 
analyses were used to assess main themes of stories, the 
variety of sources cited, and wording used, both in support 
of the war effort and against the enemy. 
Storv Themes 
The stories covered by three Japanese newspapers in 
December, 1937 were dominated by war reports related to the 
fall of Nanking. The "great victory" and "bravery" of 
Japanese soldiers were especially emphasized in this period, 
as when the "gallant spirits of the Imperial Army" and "the 
Japanese flag of 'rising sun' was shining on the wall of the 
fort."1 These themes were repeated, not only in war reports 
but also in miscellaneous stories, such as the "victory 
march" in Nanking, the memorial ceremony for Japanese 
casualties, and the tremendous number of Chinese captives. 
On the other hand, General Chiang Kai-shek and his 
government were harshly criticized for their "immorality, 
inhumanity, weakness, wickedness, and unfairness." Chinese 
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troops were portrayed as "confusedly escaping cowards" who 
"relentlessly abandoned" Chinese citizens around the Nanking 
area. When a commander of the Chinese army stated that they 
were prepared to make a powerful counterattack against the 
Japanese, the newspapers sneered and called it "a case of 
sour grapes."2 
While criticizing Chiang's government, the newspapers 
supported the puppet government created by the Japanese 
army. They uniformly stated that the new regime would bring 
"peace and independence" to China under Japanese guidance. 
All six of the stories which showed the "pro-" attitudes 
toward China in this period were not favorable to Chiang 
Kai-shek, but to the puppet government. 
The three Japanese papers were also openly critical of 
Britain and the United States because of their opposition to 
the Chinese invasion. The Soviet Union was also criticized 
because it provided military weapons to the Chinese 
communists. With regard to the USS Panay incident, there 
was no "anti-" attitude against the U.S. government; 
however, those stories (only four stories about this 
incident were found in the three newspapers) tended to be 
short and without detailed explanation and to emphasize the 
Japan's excuses for the "unintentional accident." 
At the second stage, the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, 
the themes of the stories markedly changed. The main 
interest of the newspapers shifted from China to the U.S. 
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and Britain—the primary enemies of Japan. Although the 
attitudes of news stories were relatively moderate before 
the declaration of war, the "anti-" attitudes against the 
two countries were markedly heightened after the U.S. 
government refused Japan's final response to the Hull Note 
on November 26, 1941. Not surprisingly, the "overwhelming 
victory" of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
sinking of two British battleships, the Prince of Wales and 
Repulse, were heavily publicized by the three Japanese 
newspapers. Not only did they emphasize the "weakness and 
wickedness" of the United States and Britain, but they also 
stressed the "strength" of the Japanese material and morale, 
"superior" power of the Japanese industry, and the national 
mobilization for a strong war effort. 
Along with this situation, the cooperation among the 
Axis powers and some Asian countries, such as French 
Indochina and Thailand, was also emphasized in the stories. 
The primary Japanese ideology, "The Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere," repeatedly appeared in the news coverage 
with an attempt to justify Japan's position as a "leader of 
Asian fellows." The "willingness" of native people in the 
occupied areas to cooperate with the Japanese was one of the 
favorite topics of the three papers. However, when the 
native local leaders refused to support the Japanese regime, 
the papers attacked them as "traitors to Asian prosperity."3 
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Reactions of other countries also appeared in this 
period, though they were likely to be downplayed or parts of 
summaries. Among the neutrals, Spain, Mexico, Turkey, and 
Argentina were reported to have avoided participating in the 
war because they were "frightened by the strength of 
Japanese military power." Also, the countries that declared 
war against Japan, such as Australia, Nicaragua, and Costa 
Rica, were portrayed as "dull-headed." Their involvement 
was described as being the result of coaxing or coercion by 
London and Washington.4 
The overwhelming defeat of the Japanese navy at the 
Battle of Midway was a significant turning point not only 
for the nation itself, but also for Japanese press coverage. 
Initially, only a small story reported that there had been a 
battle between the U.S. and Japanese Pacific fleets, but no 
detailed description was provided. On June 10 (Tokyo time), 
1942—a full five days after the battle—Tokyo radio 
broadcast that Japan had won a great victory, sinking two 
U.S. carriers and destroying 120 U.S. airplanes. All the 
newspaper reports followed the same line. As David 
Bergamini wrote: "Previously the Japanese media had ignored 
some setbacks in China but never had they had to tell such 
an utterly outrageous lie."5 
Instead of describing the defeat at Midway, the 
Japanese papers focussed on the military's announcement of 
"war achievements" and reports of "great victory" at the 
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Battle of the Coral Sea and the attack on Sydney Bay, 
Australia. The Japanese newspapers reported that the U.S. 
and British combined fleet was so heavily damaged as a 
result of these battles that it became a "funeral fleet." 
The Japanese military announcement provided information on 
both military gains and losses, but, of course, it did not 
include the heavy losses at Midway. When the U.S. 
government announced that the battle ended in the tremendous 
victory of the U.S. Navy, the Japanese papers criticized 
Washington for "circulating false information to deceive its 
own people."6 
Other common themes in newspapers at this time 
included: national unity, the "Greater East Asia" progress, 
criticism of Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese Communism, and the 
strength of Germany and Italy. In addition, the papers 
sometimes reported the domestic political and economic 
situations of the enemies, usually describing them in terms 
of "economic crises" or "political and social confusion." 
These reports were used to emphasize the "weakness" and 
"lack of unity" of those enemies.7 
During the fourth period, that of Japan's unconditional 
surrender in August, 1945, five main themes emerged in the 
coverage by the three Japanese newspapers. First, war 
reports related to the U.S. air raids on Japan's homeland 
dramatically increased at this period. In most cases, the 
stories were small in size and did not provide detailed 
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descriptions of damage, frequently stating that "there was 
no significant damage."8 
Second, the strength of Japanese morale (not material) 
was still emphasized in press calls for national unity for 
the emperor. Although the use of the emperor as a symbol of 
unity was employed throughout the war, this persuasion 
technique was most frequently used at the end, probably 
because it was the last means available to stir up the 
Japanese people's mind. 
Third, Japanese criticism of the use of atomic bombs by 
the U.S. air force was highlighted in news coverage. These 
"atrocity stories" were designed to emphasize the inhumanity 
of the enemy, while at the same time urging the public not 
to be afraid of the tremendous power of this new weapon. 
Fourth, the strength of Japanese soldiers' morale at 
the battlefront, such as the South Asian islands and China, 
was extraordinarily exaggerated in the stories. In fact, 
most of the soldiers in those areas died in "Banzai 
attacks," but such tragic stories were never covered by the 
Japanese newspapers. Finally, the ideological theme 
embodied in "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" 
still appeared at this period. However, the main emphasis 
shifted from the strength of Japanese troops and material to 
cooperation with the native Asian people. 
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Name and Title of Sources 
The names and titles of the sources cited in the 644 
stories by the three Japanese newspapers are listed in 
Appendix C. Overall, there were 73 Japanese sources and 118 
foreign sources. 
Interestingly, the three papers tended to use enemy 
sources (91 from the U.S., Britain, Russia, and China) 
rather than Axis sources (11 from Germany and Italy). Only 
16 "other" foreign sources were used, and they were mainly 
those of neutral countries. This result may indicate that 
Japanese newspapers used enemy sources more than might be 
expected, despite the difficulty of obtaining information 
from them. 
However, it should be noticed that foreign stories were 
usually very short, without detailed information. They were 
likely to be "rational” rather than "emotional" because of 
their limited space. Also, all three papers tended to use 
foreign sources to reinforce Tokyo's points of view; that 
is, only sources whose comments were favorable to the 
Japanese were used by the Japanese papers. For example, 
they cited the enemy sources to confirm the Japanese 
military success in battles. When enemy sources revealed 
the heavy losses of the Japanese military, the papers 
criticized the enemy for circulating "false information." 
Likewise, foreign sources of neutral countries were mostly 
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used to justify Japan's position or "justice" in 
international relations. 
From these observations, it can be assumed that the 
tremendous use of foreign sources was a part of a policy 
calculated to validate impressions that Tokyo wanted to 
convey. Two techniques might be involved in this strategy: 
government censors sought out sources who were favorable to 
the Japanese cause; or they actually attached untrue or 
inaccurate statements to foreign sources. A tendency toward 
the latter appeared after the Battle of Midway and increased 
as Japan experienced more military losses. 
Wording 
The average number of strong negative words or 
statements increased from .10 per story in 1937 to .40 in 
1945; that is, the newspapers were more likely to use those 
words or statements when Japan experienced military losses. 
However, the emotions carried by the stories were not 
determined only by the use of negative words but also by 
repetition of strong positive words. This section, 
therefore, describes the use of both kinds of words, 
positive and negative, by the three Japanese newspapers. 
At the first stage, the fall of Nanking, the main 
target of negative comments was Chinese General Chiang Kai- 
shek and his government and troops.9 For example, all the 
papers criticized Chiang's government for "enriching itself 
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by victimizing the welfare of the Chinese citizens." 
Because Chiang did not regret his "unfair" policies and 
refused to cooperate with the Japanese for the Asians' 
prosperity, he had to be "punished" by the Japanese, the 
"leader of Asia." When the Japanese army attacked Nanking, 
Chinese defenders were so "weak and confused" that they 
"only managed to escape from their capital." As a result, 
Chiang's army was "easily destroyed," and his government was 
"about to be ruined." 
On the other hand, the fightino spirit of Japanese 
soldiers was "excellent and extraordinary," supported by 
"patriotic enthusiasm" of the Japanese public in the 
homeland.10 The power of their hard blow was "like a gust 
of wind" and "threw the enemy into panic"; therefore, there 
was no doubt that they would win the battle. The 
outstanding "victory march" in Nanking "added another 
shining page to the world history," with the "flying flag of 
the rising sun." Moreover, such "great victory" was 
"inevitable" for the Japanese because they were destined to 
"establish the eternal peace of Asia," "brighten the spirit 
of the Eastern cultures," "protect the Western civilization 
from being ruined," and "contribute to the development and 
prosperity of the world." Thus, these positive words were 
deeply associated with the main Japanese government 
ideology, "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." 
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After the Pearl Harbor attack, however, all the strong 
negative words or statements were employed against the 
United States and Great Britain. Few negative comments 
about China were found at this period. This is not 
surprising, for three reasons. Most important was that the 
U.S. and Britain were not only the primary enemies, but also 
were much more powerful and, therefore, dangerous. As a 
result, the press and public normally shifted their focus to 
the Pacific naval war. At the same time, the Chinese land 
war had already produced its major victories, so there would 
not be much necessity to cover those stories on the front 
page. 
According to the stories examined, the failure of peace 
negotiations between the U.S. and Japan was caused by 
Washington, which "lacked the sincerity to keep a peaceful 
relationship" and "reinforced its economic and military 
threats against Japan." Since the U.S. and Britain intended 
to "invade and exploit the profit of Eastern Asia" and 
"ignored the reality of the world development," they were 
portrayed as "tremendous threats for Asians' peace and 
independence" and, therefore, had to be excluded from all of 
Asia.11 
To encounter such threats of the Western powers, 
Imperial Japan had "bravely stood up against the invaders." 
Its main purposes were to "protect Imperial Japan itself 
from the evil invaders," to "establish a new order for 
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Asians,” and to "bring rapid progress and prosperity in 
Greater East Asia."12 The Japanese "historical surprise 
attack" on Pearl Harbor was described as having been 
essential to achieving these "fair purposes." The victory 
itself was seen as an "unprecedented success in the world 
history" and "proved the superiority of the Japanese 
military power." Japanese pilots were "brave and determined 
with divine spirits" and "showed their abilities to the 
full," heavily bombing and firing on the enemy. As a 
result, the U.S. navy was "mortally damaged" and "had no 
power to fight back against Imperial Japan."13 
Negative comments against the enemy became more severe 
and exaggerated at the third period, the Battle of Midway in 
June, 1942. This was also the period of the greatest 
distortion by the Japanese press because of its almost total 
lack of coverage of the defeat at Midway. Instead, front 
page stories focused on two less important battles. They 
were the successful attack on Sydney Bay and the Battle of 
the Coral Sea, which ended in a draw, but which was reported 
by the Japanese papers as "overwhelming victory." 
The descriptions of the two battles were as follows:14 
To save the Asian areas that were "unreasonably invaded" by 
the Western powers, the Japanese navy attacked the Allied 
combined fleet at Sydney Bay and the Coral Sea. These 
surprise attacks were described as being so well-performed 
that the "incapable and lazy" U.S. and British navy were 
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"mortally damaged" and "corrupted into a funeral fleet." 
This, it was said, revealed their "strategic incompetence 
and clumsiness." According to the Japanese press, 
Washington was so surprised by these "tremendous defeats" 
that the U.S. government resorted to "false information 
which distorted the truth" to deceive the "ignorant and 
easygoing" American public. Such demagoguery proved the 
"immorality, dishonesty, and abnormal superiority complex" 
of the U.S. government. The conclusion revealed by the 
three papers, therefore, was that "there is no chance for 
the U.S. to win the war as long as President Roosevelt takes 
charge of militaristic strategies." 
Some negative comments against China were also found at 
this period.15 According to the Japanese newspapers, Chiang 
Kai-shek was a "ignorant, selfish, and ambitious" leader who 
blindly believed the "insane and abusive words" of the U.S 
and Britain. He was portrayed as being "too stupid to 
realize that the U.S. and Britain would easily abandon him 
and his China if the war situation becomes unfavorable to 
them." The papers also criticized his refusal of the 
"friendly support" of the Japanese government and his 
willingness to "sell his country to the Western invaders 
against Japan." 
On the other hand, the Japanese, again, were portrayed 
in the home press as "the savior of the world."1** Their 
"sacred mission" was to establish "an eternal stability and 
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peace in Eastern Asia," which would bring about "world-wide 
peace and development." Since Japanese soldiers were 
strongly inspired by the mission, they were "brave, daring, 
and determined," "advancing like raging waves." Their naval 
strategies were so "incomparably magnificent," giving a 
"deadly blow" to the enemy, that "the American Stars and 
Stripes is fading in the presence of the Japanese rising 
sun." Overall, the results of the two battles (the Battle 
of the Coral Sea and the attack on Sydney Bay) were 
described as "historical achievements" that made the war 
situation "extremely favorable to Japan," and "the Asian 
fellows are satisfied with our successive victories." 
Some differences, however, appeared at the final stage- 
-just prior to Japan's surrender in August, 1945.17 With 
regard to black propaganda against the enemy, most negative 
comments were associated with "atrocity stories" about the 
use of two atomic bombs against Japanese citizens. For 
example, the Japanese newspapers harshly criticized the U.S. 
for the "inhumanity and cruelty" that were manifested by the 
attempt to "massacre innocent citizens." The use of atomic 
bombs was an "unprecedentedly cruel atrocity in the human 
history," which "threatened human existence," and proved the 
"brutality and cold-bloodedness of horrible demons." Thus, 
the U.S. government was accused of trying to "accomplish its 
purpose by any means," ignoring the "value of human life." 
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The difficult war situation for the Japanese also 
brought about some changes in the propaganda carried by the 
Japanese newspapers to keep up home front morale.18 Because 
of increased U.S. air raids on Japan's homeland, the amount 
of "victory news” decreased, and was replaced by "Fight for 
the Emperor" stories. The main logic of these stories was 
as follows: "The war situation becomes unfavorable to us, 
but if we work harder for the emperor, we can make it." 
Such logic was not only unrealistic, but also revealed that 
propagandists had been forced to resort to desperate 
measures by implying that victory could still be achieved 
because of the holy power of the emperor to work miracles. 
For example, one story stated: "Implore god on your 
knees.... for the eternal existence of Imperial Japan.... 
Then, our Yamato (Japanese) people may be saved from this 
crisis." Another story wrote: "Although the new bombs 
caused tremendous damage on our homeland, we Japanese will 
never surrender to the enemy. Do not doubt our ultimate 
triumph. Hold your fighting spirit, even if you die....and 
find a way out of this difficulty." 
A few small "victory" stories still appeared at this 
period, even though they were from limited battle fields, 
the South Eastern islands and China.19 The enthusiastic 
tone of the stories, which was the main characteristic of 
white propaganda from 1937 to 1942, had by now faded, but 
the heroism of Japanese soldiers was more emphasized. For 
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example, a story said that Japanese troops at the South 
Eastern battle fronts "repeatedly launched overwhelming 
attacks against the enemy and killed the thousands of them." 
Also, guerrilla warfare conducted by the Japanese "heroes" 
was so "powerful and successful" that "the enemy troops are 
awkwardly retreating with the loss of their fighting 
spirit." 
Not surprisingly, the same kind of wording was used in 
domestic war reports about the U.S. air raids on the 
homeland. Typical of these stories was that "hundreds of 
the enemy planes flew over our home land, but retreated when 
our air force bravely encountered them." As a result, the 
enemy was "heavily damaged," while "our losses and damages 
were very little." 
Finally, it should be mentioned that these strong 
negative and positive words or statements were repeatedly 
used by the Japanese newspapers through the four periods. 
The Japanese soldiers were portrayed as "heroes with 
brilliant spirits." Generally, the Japanese navy, army, and 
air force were called "sea eagle," "land eagle," and 
"violent eagle," respectively. On the other hand, the 
enemies, especially the U.S. and Britain, were usually 
described as "demons" or "brutal beasts" who were inhuman, 
cruel, and morally corrupted. Also, it was observed that 
Japanese war propaganda was based more on white propaganda 
with strong positive comments for the Japanese, rather than 
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black propaganda against the enemies, even though the number 
of strong negative words against the enemies increased as 
Japan experienced increasing military losses after the 
Battle of Midway. 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
The quantitative content analysis revealed that over 
90% of the stories examined were written by the staff of the 
three Japanese newspapers or the United News Agency (DSmei) 
through the four periods. This indicates that the 
management of news stories was mainly in hands of Japanese 
writers whose actions were clearly dictated by government 
and military instructions. The high percentage (44.6%) of 
non-source stories also suggests that writers frequently 
used their own analysis or observation to write their 
stories without using any identifiable sources of 
information. Therefore, it can be concluded that official 
controls over the Japanese press were relatively thorough 
and successful, from December 1937 through World War II. 
The observed differences of content trends through the 
four periods may be explained by the different situations in 
which the selected four events occurred. 
For example, in the case of the fall of Nanking in 
1937, the battle between Chinese and Japanese troops lasted 
for four days. It was the greatest moment of military 
victory for the Japanese since the outbreak of Sino-Japanese 
hostility in 1931, or indeed since the early 1900s. Because 
of this situation, newspaper coverage was filled with 
victory stories about Japanese troops. The tremendous 
number of Japanese war correspondents sent to the 
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battlefront contributed to the increase of non-source 
stories, because many reported their sensational "eye¬ 
witness” stories without by-lines. Also, these reporters 
were heavily dependent on Japanese military sources for war 
information, so the variety of sources decreased during this 
period. 
The long-standing hostility between China and Japan was 
also manifested in anti-Chinese feeling in the Japanese 
newspapers through the four periods. In fact, it was 
stronger than negative attitudes toward the United States 
and Great Britain. Most of these negative attitudes were 
expressed toward Chiang Kai-shek and his government, because 
it was believed by the Japanese that Chiang refused friendly 
support from the Japanese emperor to protect his country 
from "being invaded" by western powers. 
During the second period, concerning the surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor, the main attention of the Japanese 
press shifted from China to the United States. Even though 
anti-U.S. feeling had been increasingly heightened in Japan, 
the stories covered in the two issues before the Pearl 
Harbor attack were relatively rational and reasonable, with 
detailed explanations of diplomatic negotiations between the 
two countries. However, this dramatically changed after the 
attack, with strong emphases on victory news of the Japanese 
navy. From this moment, the United States became Japan's 
primary enemy, and this trend continued throughout the war. 
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Although anti-British feeling was just as strong as anti- 
American feeling in the Japanese newspapers, Britain tended 
to be considered the second primary enemy among the Allied 
countries. 
Some specific changes in content trends also occurred 
during this period. For example, non-source stories 
decreased from 1937 to 1941, and the total number of sources 
cited in stories increased. This change was probably caused 
by the increased concern with diplomatic negotiations and 
the location of the battle. It can be assumed that it was 
difficult for Japanese writers to depend only upon their own 
analyses and observations when a significant event was 
related to foreign relations occurring outside Japan. Also, 
the increased use of Japanese government sources during this 
period can be explained by these situations. 
Probably the most significant period for the Japanese 
press was the defeat at the Battle of Midway, when the 
Japanese navy experienced devastating losses. No detailed 
description of the battle appeared in Japanese newspapers. 
Instead, the newspapers focussed on two other engagements 
that could be described as victories—the invasion of Sydney 
and the Battle of the Coral Sea. 
Among Japanese government sources, the Cabinet 
Information Bureau was most frequently cited by journalists, 
because all information related to Japanese naval actions in 
the Pacific and southeast oceans was transmitted by the 
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United News Agency, which was under the absolute control of 
the bureau. The bureau also provided some analyses of the 
war situation during this period. 
It can be also assumed that the high degree of emotion 
observed in 1942 was caused by these situations; that is, 
the Japanese press tried to conceal factual information on 
the defeat by exaggerating victory news of other battles. 
However, it would be more reasonable to think that such a 
"strategy of the big-lie" was initiated by government or 
military leaders rather than by journalists, because there 
was no way for the latter to find out what was happening in 
the outside world. 
Finally, it may be concluded that Japanese 
propagandists failed to accomplish their goals during the 
final period, that of Japan's unconditional surrender, as 
pointed out by Charles Lomas and Anthony Rhodes.1 The 
Japanese public became increasingly aware of the actual war 
situation when they saw the U.S. air force dropping bombs on 
their homeland. Nobody would expect to win the war in that 
situation. By then they must have realized the gap between 
reports by domestic newspapers and the reality. Japanese 
newspapers could no longer persuade the people to believe in 
ultimate triumph, though they still tried to emphasize the 
strength of Japanese material and morale. 
For example, the writers sometimes carried their own 
analyses and observations in their stories containing war 
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reports related to air raids. Those stories tended to 
maximize the enemy's losses and minimize the damage to 
Japanese property. For this reason, the number of non¬ 
source stories increased during this period. Also, since 
"air raid news" was mainly provided by military headquarters 
in each domestic district, the number of Japanese military 
sources increased. Atrocity stories related to the atomic 
bombs provided the press with a suitable topic for criticism 
of the enemy, but it was useful to emphasize only the 
"wickedness of the enemy," not the strength of Japan. 
Two additional comments about propaganda techniques 
employed in the three Japanese newspapers from 1937 to 1945 
should be mentioned. First, "emotional" stories were likely 
to be made the leading stories. They tended to be given 
large play, and usually carried big pictures which showed 
"brave" Japanese soldiers attacking (or about to attack) the 
"weak" enemy. On the other hand, "rational" stories tended 
to be much less detailed and placed on the bottom half of 
the front page. As a result, the main impression conveyed 
to the Japanese public would be emotional rather than 
rational, although more than two thirds of the total number 
of stories were rational. 
Second, as in the case of "emotional" stories, 
"slanted" stories usually appeared in the top half of the 
issues, with "slanted" headlines in large size, while 
"unslanted" stories were most likely to appear at the bottom 
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in small size. Thus, Japanese readers were likely to be 
more strongly influenced by "slanted" stories than by 
"unslanted" ones. Also, these stories tended to contain 
more strong negative words than did rational and unslanted 
stories. Thus, the possible effects of those words on the 
Japanese public would be more significant than is reflected 
in the small total numbers which were observed in this 
study. Such techniques of news management were consistently 
employed by the three Japanese newspapers throughout the 
periods studied, from 1937 to 1945. 
These analyses and observations of content trends of 
the three Japanese newspapers before and during World War II 
may suggest some theoretical implications about the 
functions of mass media as a propaganda instrument in crisis 
situations. Four main variables are considered to have 
significant influences on the efficacy of war propaganda: 
(1) military situations; (2) presence of objective reality 
observable to the public; (3) powerfulness of the state 
control over the media; and (4) communication technologies 
available to propagandists. 
First, as suggested by previous studies and expected by 
this study, the changes of military situations during the 
war somewhat affected the content of the three papers. For 
example, the degree of emotion expressed in news stories 
became higher in defeats, 1942 and 1945, than in victory 
periods of 1937 and 1941. The most significant changes 
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occurred in 1942, probably because the state suffered its 
first major, and most crucial, defeat at the Battle of 
Midway. It was observed that factual information was 
provided by Tokyo as long as military situations were 
favorable to Japan, when the state experienced heavy 
military losses, the government concealed the truth from the 
public. For this purpose, more press restrictions would be 
employed by the state. 
However, the changes of Japanese press performance that 
occurred at the final days of the war could not be explained 
only by military situations. The degree of emotion in 
stories decreased during this period from 1942, whereas the 
highest was expected. This occurred probably because the 
awareness of the Japanese public about the reality of defeat 
increased when they saw the enemy air force dropping bombs 
on their homeland. Such a presence of objective reality 
caused the public to discredit information provided by 
propagandists. The effects of propaganda techniques, 
especially those by means of a strategy of the big-lie, 
would be weakened compared to those employed in the periods 
during which the public was not aware of reality. 
Third, the power of state controls over the media would 
have significant influence on the effectiveness of 
propaganda. As pointed by Anthony Rhodes, the structure of 
fascism in Japan was not as well-organized as it had been in 
Germany.2 Therefore, Japanese leaders lost their power to 
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control the press when they suffered desperate military 
situations and lost their credibility as leaders. This 
situation was complicated by an underlying disagreement 
between government leaders and military headquarters in war 
aims and propaganda emphases. As a result, Japanese 
propagandists had difficulty concentrating on a few simple 
themes, and conflicting view points given to the press 
diluted the effectiveness of domestic propaganda, especially 
during the final period of the war. 
Finally, it can be assumed that communication 
technologies available to propagandists would influence the 
efficacy of propaganda techniques. For example, it has been 
pointed out that German propaganda was more effective in the 
use of visual communications than that of Japan, and, 
therefore, had more powerful influence on the public.3 If 
Japanese propagandists had considered such effects of visual 
messages on the public's mind, their domestic propaganda 
would have been more successful. In this sense, the 
dramatically increased capacity of modern communication 
technologies, especially television and satellite 
communication, might have significantly influenced the 
effectiveness of propaganda in modern wars. However, at the 
same time, well-developed technologies could just as easily 
create difficulties for propagandists seeking to conceal or 
manipulate factual information. 
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Finally, some suggestions for future research of 
Japanese war propaganda should be mentioned. 
First, content analysis with a different sample may 
provide more detailed characteristics of content trends of 
Japanese newspapers both before and during World War II. 
For example, it would be useful to include stories from page 
two, as well as the front page, and samples from additional 
time periods between 1932 and 1945. Since this study was 
conducted by a single researcher with limited time, only 
front-page stories were examined. If the same kind of 
research with a different sample were conducted by several 
scholars, more concrete and useful information might be 
obtained. Also, it can be expected that the reliability of 
coding would increase if the sample stories were coded by 
several coders. 
Second, a probability sampling method would be more 
appropriate than the intentional sampling applied in this 
research, which selected four significant events related to 
World War II. Although this method was useful to describe 
the most distinctive characteristics of content of the three 
Japanese newspapers, some statistical limitations made it 
difficult to generalize the obtained data into the 
interpretation of the study population. The use of simple 
random sampling or systematic sampling would solve this kind 
of problem. 
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Third, the length of stories should be considered to 
determine the degree of emotion carried by the stories. It 
was observed in this research that the longer the story, the 
more emotions could be expressed by the writer of the story. 
For example, the overall impression of the front page would 
be determined as "highly emotional" if one emotional story 
dominated more than half of the front page. Such an 
impression would not be altered even if the rest of the page 
were devoted to "rational" stories. This technique of 
playing the more emotional stories at the top of the front 
page in large size was frequently used by all three Japanese 
newspapers. This observation may suggest that such a trend, 
which is not reflected in the numbers, might be overlooked 
if the analysis does not pay attention to the size of 
stories. 
Fourth, the use of pictorial messages should be also 
considered in this kind of content analysis. Generally, the 
three Japanese newspapers carried big pictures or drawings 
of Japanese troops, airplanes, or battleships on the front 
page. Since those pictorial messages were usually emotional 
with sensational and stimulating captions, it would be 
assumed that they had significant influence on the Japanese 
public's mind. Because of time limits, this research did 
not deal with pictorial techniques employed by the Japanese 
newspapers, but it would be useful to pay attention to these 
aspects to understand Japanese war propaganda techniques. 
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Fifth, it will be valuable to consider not only the 
number of strong negative words, but also the positive words 
or statements used to publicize the "strength" of Japanese 
material or morale. One of the observed characteristics in 
this research was that the three papers more frequently used 
strong positive words toward the Japanese than negative 
words against the enemy. This means that the degree of 
emotion was more likely to be determined by the use of 
strong positive words than by the use of negative words. It 
should be noticed that a story could be highly "emotional" 
without any negative words against the enemy, if it was 
filled with positive words concerning the Japanese. 
Finally, quantitative analysis of content trends of 
other Japanese mass media, especially radio, will also 
contribute to the better understanding of Japanese war 
propaganda. Since radio was another influential medium in 
shaping the public opinion of the Japanese during the war, 
content analysis of radio broadcasting would be useful to 
learn how the government and military controlled the 
Japanese masses' points of view. Although many studies of 
domestic radio broadcasting during the war have been 
conducted by Japanese scholars, they tend to be qualitative 
analyses with a small sample size rather than quantitative, 
and, therefore, lack a systematic method for the analysis. 
The application of quantitative methods with a large sample 
178 
size may provide useful statistical evidence to describe 
content trends of wartime radio programs. 
***** 
Daniel Lerner once wrote: "Propaganda is the 
distinctive instrument which manipulates only the symbols by 
which people think, feel, believe; it works with threats and 
promises to affect people's hopes and fears."4 He also 
suggests that there are four main targets to which 
propagandists adapt their strategies: (1) enemies—theme of 
their ultimate defeat; (2) allies—loyalty, unity, and 
ultimate triumph; (3) neutrals—righteousness and ultimate 
triumph of allies; and (4) the home front—the need for war 
. . . . s 
effort and sacrifice to achieve victory. 
The main role of the Japanese press before and during 
World War II was the fourth—to persuade the Japanese public 
to support the national war effort. Under the strict 
controls and guidance of the government and military, the 
state-controlled press successfully manipulated information, 
shaped public opinion, and maintained patriotic enthusiasm 
among the Japanese public. Isolated from the outside world, 
most Japanese citizens never doubted the "justice" of their 
cause and ultimate victory. Also, the "sacred" image of the 
emperor held by the Japanese people greatly contributed to 
mobilizing national unity. 
Although the Japanese press tried to provide factual 
news so long as the war situation was favorable to Japan, it 
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could not help circulating false information when Japan 
began to experience heavy military losses after the Battle 
of Midway in June, 1942. The Japanese soldiers were always 
portrayed as "heroes,” while the image of the enemy was 
"evil," "cruel," "inhuman," and "immoral." Toward the end, 
the Japanese were told that if they lost the war, the enemy 
would kill their children, parents, families, friends, and, 
finally, their emperor. Such a distortion of reality was 
commonly used by the Japanese domestic media. In this 
sense, Japanese war propaganda was based on the use of false 
context—a strategy of the big lie. This was also a 
characteristic of German propaganda during World War II, 
though the Nazis were more effective and skillful than the 
Japanese. 
For the last five decades, the Japanese press has 
experienced a democratic style of freedom of speech. There 
has been a general belief that the press will be always "an 
organ for the people," not for the government or state. 
However, it should be remembered that it is very difficult 
for the press to continue to provide truth in a crisis 
situation. As historically suggested, truth is the first 
casualty of any war.6 
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APPENDIX A. LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF OFFICIAL CENSORSHIP 
IN JAPAN FROM 1868 TO 1945 
(Note: The laws underlined are the most significant regulations 
related to press censorship. The term '•press” refers to 
newspapers and magazines, while "publication" includes any 
other publications, such as books, leaflets, etc.) 
(Year) 
1868 
1868 
1869 
(Press) (Publication) 
First Meiji censorship decree 
... I Second Meiji censorship decree 
* Press Publication * Publication Ordinance 
Ordinance 
1872 
1873 
1875 
1875 
1883 
1887 
1893 
1897 
1909 
1934 
1941 
Publication Ordinance (2nd) 
V 
Stipulations for 
the Press 
1 . .1 
Press Ordinance Publication Ordinance (3rd) 
■* Libel Law * 
*■ . . . i . 
Press Ordinance (2nd) Publication Ordinance (4th) 
l . . .1 
Press Ordinance (3rd) Publication Ordinance (5th) 
. .1 
* Publication Law 
Press Law 
* Press Law (2nd) 
. ▼ Publication Law (2nd) 
* Press Business 
Ordinance 
1943 Publication Business 
Ordinance 
JL 1945 
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Other regulations related to the press 
1. Public Gatherings Ordinance (1880) 
2. Public Gatherings Ordinance (2nd, 1882) 
3. Peace Preservation Ordinance (1887) 
4. Great Japanese Imperial Constitution (Meiji Constitution, 
1889) 
5. Public Gatherings and Political Association Law (1890) 
6. Military Secrets Protection Law (1899) 
7. Public Peace Police Law (1900) 
8. Peace Preservation Law (1925) 
9. Extraordinary Control Law for Seditious Literature (1936) 
10. National Mobilization Law (1938) 
11. Military Resources Secrets Protection Law (1939) 
12. National Defense Security Law (1941) 
13. Ordinance for Restrictions on Periodical and Other 
Publications (1941) 
14. Emergency Law for Control of Speech, Publication, 
Assembly, Association, and So Forth (1941) 
Regulations related to broadcasting censorship 
1. Wireless Telegraphy Law (1915) 
2. Regulations on Private Broadcasting Wireless Telephone 
Facilities (1923) 
3. Wireless Telegraphy Law (2nd, 1929) 
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APPENDIX B. CODING SHEET 
(Story code number) 
(Paper)   1. Asahi;   2. Yomiuri;   3. Mainichi. 
(Date)   Year;  Month;  Day. 
(Kind of story)   1. Domestic/war-related 
  2. Domestic/non-war 
  3. Foreign/war-related 
 4. Foreign/non-war 
(Writer of story) 1. Staff of the newspaper 
2. Japanese wire service (Domei) 
3. UP 
4. AP 
5. Reuters 
6. Agence francaise 
7. Other or uncertain 
(Number of sources) 
  * Total number of sources cited in story. 
  How many are identified by name and specific title? 
   How many are used without name, but by specific title? 
  How many are used without name and only by general 
title ("government spokesman," etc.)? 
(Variety of source)   1. Japanese government 
 2. Japanese military 
  3. Other Japanese 
 4. Foreign sources 
(Name of source) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
(Title of source) 
191 
(Overall category) 
  1. War news 
  2. Strength of Japanese material/morale/morals 
  3. Japanese solidarity with "Greater East Asia Co 
-Prosperity Sphere" & its progress 
  4. Strength of Axis powers 
  5. Domestic news (non-war/political/economic) 
  6. Foreign news (non-war/political/economic) 
  7. Weakness or wickedness of U.S. material/morale/morals 
  8. Weakness or wickedness of Great Britain 
  9. Weakness or wickedness of enemy (collectively) 
  10. Fear stories (atrocities/war crimes) 
  11. Miscellaneous (war-related) 
  12. Miscellaneous (non-war) 
(Title/headline) 
(Slant of headline) 
  1. Slanted (pro-Japanese or anti-enemy) 
  2. Unslanted/neutral/factual 
(Slant of story) [When read in full, does the story convey a 
slant?] 
  1. Yes: Slanted toward Japan or Axis 
  2. Yes: Slanted against enemy 
  3. No: Unslanted/neutral about Japan or Axis 
  4. No: Unslanted/neutral about enemy 
  5. Can not tell or other 
(Emotional technique) 
  1. Highly rational 
  2. Somewhat rational 
 3. Somewhat emotional 
  4. Highly emotional 
(Number of strong negative words or statements)   
(Main theme or summary of story) 
192 
(Direction of attitude) 
1: Anti- 2. Neutral 3. Pro- 
1. Enemy: A. U.S. 
B. Britain 
C. Russia 
D. China 
2. Axis E. Germany 
F. Italy 
G. Japan 
Examples of possible black propaganda (such as charges that enemy 
machine-gunned Japanese aviation personnel who had bailed out in 
parachutes or were adrift in rubber boats): 
Examples of strong negative words or statements: 
Examples of possible white propaganda (such as how our boys have 
"added another shining page to their record of achievements"): 
Examples of use of quotes without attribution (such as "a heavy 
toll of enemy planes was taken by Japanese defenders"): 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF SOURCES CITED IN THE STORIES OF THREE 
JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS FROM 1937 TO 1945 
(Note: The names and titles are translated from Japanese 
characters into English. The names of foreign sources 
which were not verified are omitted.) 
1. Japanese Government (33) 
(Title) (Name) 
Alliance for Imperial Rule 
Assistance 
Ambassador at Berlin 
Ambassador at Thailand 
Army Ministry 
Cabinet Information Bureau 
Chief Secretary of Trade Bureau, 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Emperor 
Finance Minister 
Foreign Minister 
Grand Chamberlain of 
Imperial Palace 
Imperial Rule Assistance 
Association (IRAA) 
Manager of the 3rd Division of 
Cabinet Information Bureau 
Manager of the 3rd Division of 
Cabinet Information Bureau 
Manager of Information Division 
of Japanese Embassy in China 
Minister of Agriculture and 
Commerce 
Minister of Home Affairs 
Minister of Navy 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Commerce 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Ministry of Communications 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
Ministry of Imperial Household 
Minister of State Affairs 
Minister of Welfare 
Navy Minister 
Oshima, Hiroshi (1941) 
Tsubogami (1942) 
Hishinuma (1941) 
Hirohito 
Kaya, Okinori (1941) 
Togo, Heihachiro (1945) 
Baron Hozumi (1945) 
Iguchi (1945) 
Hori, Teikichi (1942) 
Yoshitomi (1942) . 
Ishiguro (1945) 
Suetsugu, Nobumasa 
(1937) 
Shimada, Shigetaro 
(1941) 
Ando, Kisaburo (1942) 
Okada, Keisuke (1945) 
Yonai, Mitsumasa (1937) 
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(Title) 
Navy Ministry 
President of Cabinet Planning Board 
President of Research Committee on 
State Affairs (IRAA) 
Prime Minister 
Prime Minister 
Privy Council 
Social Affairs Bureau, Ministry of 
Home Affairs 
(Name) 
Yamazaki, Tatsunosuke 
(1942) 
Suzuki, Kantaro (1945) 
Tojo, Hideki (1941) 
2. Japanese Military (32) 
(Title) 
Air Defense Head Office 
Army Department of High Command 
Office 
Army General Staff of Central 
Division of Military Service 
Chief Commander of Army in 
Chinese Districts 
Chief Commander of Army in 
Java Districts 
Chief Commander of Army in 
Philippines Districts 
Chief Commander of Army in 
Shanghai Expeditionary Force 
Chief Commander of Army in 
Sumatra Districts 
Chief Commander of Navy in 
Chinese Districts 
Chief Commander of Navy in 
Chinese Districts 
Corporal (Nanking Expeditionary 
Force) 
Expeditionary Force in 
Central China 
Expeditionary Force in 
Southern China 
Former Governor-General of 
Korean Army 
Governor of Imperial Reservists 
Association 
Headquarter of Central Division 
of Military Service 
Headquarter of Eastern Division 
of Military Service 
(Name) 
Akatsuka (1945) 
Okamura (1945) 
Yamashita (1945) 
Matsui, Iwane (1937) 
Hasegawa, Kiyoshi 
(1937) 
Koga, Mineichi (1941) 
It5, Takashi (1937) 
Minami, Jiro (1942) 
Prince Nashimoto 
(1945) 
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(Title) (Name) 
Headquarter of Northeastern 
Division of Military Service 
Headquarter of Northern Division 
of Military Service 
Headquarter of Western Division 
of Military Service 
High Command Office 
Information Division of Naval 
Shanghai Expeditionary Force 
Korean Army 
Kwantung Army (in Manchukuo) 
Manager of Information Division of 
Southern Expeditionary Force 
Navy Department of High Command 
Office 
President of Imperial Reservists 
Association 
President of Navy General Staff 
Private First Class 
(Nanking Expeditionary Force) 
Private First Class 
(Nanking Expeditionary Force) 
Section Chief of Information Division 
of Navy Department (High Command) 
Southern Expeditionary Force 
Saito, Jiro (1942) 
Inoue, Ikutaro (1945) 
Prince Fushimi (1937) 
Mukai, Tsurumatsu 
(1937) 
Yamamoto, Hisamatsu 
(1937) 
Hiraide, Hideo (1942) 
3. Other Japanese (8) 
(Title) (Name) 
Central Committee of Industrial 
Association 
Doctor of Law 
Doctor of Science, Professor of 
Osaka University 
National Federation of Industrial 
Organizations 
President of Industrial Facilities 
Business Organization 
President of Wartime Agricultural 
Association 
Volunteers Council for Minseito 
(Constitutional Democratic Party) 
None 
Kiyose (1945) 
Fushimi, K6ji (1945) 
Fujiwara, GinjirS 
(1941) 
Sengoku, Kotaro (1945) 
Tawara, Magoichi (1937) 
Miyata, Seiichi (1945) 
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4. Foreign Sources 
A. The United States (42) 
(Title) 
Army and Air Force Headquarter 
in Canada 
Army and Air Force Headquarter 
in China 
Brigadier General 
Chief Commander of Army in 
Chinese Districts 
Chief Commander of South Defense 
Force 
Chief Commander of Southwestern 
Pacific Allied Combined Fleet 
Commander of the 8th Air Force 
Critic 
Critic 
Critic 
Department of Army 
Department of Navy 
Department of State 
Diplomatic Critic 
Director of Wartime Production 
Embassy at Peking 
Former Chief Commander of 
Asian Fleet 
Government/White House 
Governor of Hawaii 
Mayor of New York City 
Navy Critic 
NBC Broadcasting 
New York Columbia Broadcasting 
"Newspaper Magnate" 
President 
President 
Presidential Secretary 
Presidential Secretary 
President of Senate Diplomatic 
Committee 
Professor of Columbia University 
Professor of University of Chicago 
San Fransisco Broadcasting 
Secretary of State 
(Name) 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 
(1945) 
MacArthur, Douglas 
(1942) 
Doolittle, James (1945) 
Salivan, Mark (1942) 
Shean, Vincent (1942) 
Snow, Edgar (1942) 
Peffer, Nathaniel (1942) 
Yarnell, Harry E. 
(1942) 
Poindexter (1941) 
Victoria (1941) 
Bywater (1942) 
Hearst, William R. 
(1942) 
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 
(1937, 1941, 1942) 
Truman, Harry S. (1945) 
Ross, Charles (1945) 
Lasswell, Harold D. 
(1945) 
Hull, Cordell (1941) 
(Title) 
Secretary of War 
197 
(Name) 
Stimson, Henry L. 
(1945) 
Senator (Republican) Taft (1945) 
The Chicago Tribune 
The Christian Science Monitor 
The Daily Express 
The Economist 
The New York Herald Tribune 
The New York Times 
Under Secretary of State Grew, Joseph C. (1945) 
B. Great Britain (18) 
(Title) 
Army Headquarter in Cairo 
Army Headquarter in Hongkong 
Army Ministry 
BBC Broadcasting 
Embassy at China 
Foreign Minister 
Foreign Minister 
Foreign Ministry 
Government/White Hall 
Hong Kong Broadcasting 
Labour Party 
Ministry of Commerce 
Navy Minister 
Navy Ministry 
Prime Minister 
Prime Minister 
The Daily Mail 
The London Times 
(Name) 
Eden (1937) 
Bevin (1945) 
Cooper (1937) 
Churchill, Winston 
(1941, 1942) 
Attlee, Clement (1945) 
C. Russia (11) 
(Title) 
Ambassador at Tokyo 
Ambassador at Washington 
Charge d'affairs at Berlin 
Foreign Minister 
General Secretary of 
the Communist Party 
(Name) 
Malik (1945) 
Litvinov (1941) 
Molotov (1945) 
Stalin, Josef 
(1941, 1942, 1945) 
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(Title) (Name) 
Government 
Information Division 
Leningrad Broadcasting 
Tass Agency 
The Red Star 
White Russian Bureau 
D. China (20) 
(Title) (Name) 
Alliance for Peace Preservation 
in Beijing and Tianjin District 
Alliance for Peace Preservation 
in Northern Shandong District 
Ambassador Extraordinary 
Assistant Ambassador Extraordinary 
Chief Secretary of Central Committee 
on Politics 
Chongqing Broadcasting 
Chongqing Government 
Commander of Nanking Defense Force 
Director of Legislative House 
Eastern Hebei Government 
Interim Mayor of Peking 
Manager of Diplomatic Department 
Manager of Financial Department 
(Chongqing Government) 
Manager of Propaganda Department 
Mongolia and Xinjiang Joint Committee 
Provisional Government of 
Republic China 
Shanghai Broadcasting 
Xinhua Daily 
None 
Chiang, Kai-shek 
(1937-1945) 
Chu, Minyi (1942) 
Yang, Kuiyi (1942) 
Zhang (1937) 
Tang, Shandong (1937) 
Sun, Ke (1945) 
Jiang, Chaozong (1937) 
Guo, Taiqi (1941) 
Kong, Xiangxi (1945) 
Shao, Lizi (1945) 
Zhu, Shaoliang (1937) 
E. Germany (7) 
(Title) (Name) 
Adolf 
1941, 1942) 
Hitler, 
(1937, 
Army Headquarter 
Army Headquarter in Paris 
Doctor of Biology Nikolai (1945) 
Doctor of Science Klauzewitz (1945) 
Government 
Manager of Army Information Division Schmitt (1941) 
F. Italy (4) 
(Title) (Name) 
Mussolini, Benito 
(1937, 1941, 1942) 
Government 
Osselevatole Romano 
Tart 
G. Other (16) 
(Title) (Name) 
Argentine Government 
Army Minister of Australia 
Finnish Government 
Former Prime Minister of Egypt 
Home Ministry of Chili 
Manila Broadcasting 
Mexican Government 
National Zaitzuno (Switzerland) 
President of Mexico 
President of Philippines 
Prime Minister of Australia 
Prime Minister of Belgium 
Prime Minister of New Zealand 
Prime Minister of Thailand 
Singapore Government 
Turkish Government 
Ford (1942) 
Camacho, Avila (1941) 
Quezon (1941) 
Curtin, John (1942) 
Acker, Achille (1945) 
Fraser, Peter (1945) 
Pibul, Luang (1941) 
